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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Background 
The European Parliament's Committee on PECH wishes to commission a research study on 
Landing obligation and choke species in multispecies and mixed fisheries. The topic is linked to 
three geographical areas: the South Western Waters, the North Western Waters and the North 
Sea. One of the study is: “Landing obligation and choke species in multispecies and choke 
species- the North Sea” 
 
A key objective of the 2013 Common Fisheries Policy is to gradually eliminate discards, by 1st 
January 2019 at the latest. 
 
The obligation to land all species in all fisheries introduced by the CFP, and hence progressively 
banning discarding, has led Member States to revise their approach to fisheries management 
according to their national allocations of quota. It is especially the case in multispecies and 
mixed fisheries impacted by the landing obligation. This new scenario on the one hand creates 
an incentive to develop more selective gears and landing all fish caught; while on the other 
hand, reducing the effect of the lack of quota for some species that will force the early closure 
of some fisheries i.e., the “choke effect”. 
 
Since 2014 progress has been made. This progress can be summarized in three phases: 
 
First phase: renewal of fishing 
1. Take advantage of all species inevitably captured: looking for other commercial outlets 
including those for non-direct human consumption; 
 
2. Reduce discards through the establishment of temporary EU regional discards plans. To date, 
15 of them have been adopted; 
 
3. Investigating and adapting fishing gear to improve selectivity and reduce unwanted catches; 
 
4. Reorienting the productive strategy of mixed fisheries, moving from single species to 
multispecies (spatial-temporal closures ....) 
 
Second Phase: remedial measures 
1. Using the tools provided for in the CFP to alleviate the lack of quotas for some species and 
reduce the risk of choke species: the high survivability exemption; the de minimis-exemption; 
adjustments of TACs: TAC top-ups, redistribution of national quotas, including a by-catch quota 
for choke species,inter-species and inter annual flexibility. 
 
2. Carrying out quota exchanges (swaps of the same or distinct species) among countries for 
this purpose 
 
Third phase: remaining problems and solutions 
1. Assessing the feasibility of the available tools within the CFP and evaluating the effects of 
choke species, from a biological, economic and social point of view; 
 
2. Find solutions: assess the current distribution of quota against catches and possible 
adjustments that could be made to re-balance this. 
 
3. The role of regionalisation and the identification of responsible for implementation, follow-
up and control of viable solutions. 
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Objectives and content 
a) overall objective 
Considering the background , to describe and assess the real problem of multispecies and mixed 
fisheries at regional level, in the current situation and under new scenarios (e.g. EU27 and a 
new CFP):identify choke species that have the potential to limit catches. Finally, assess whether 
the CFP contains effective and sufficient tools to deal with such issues and to allow 
implementation of the landing obligation. 
 
b) Research objectives 
In the North Sea: 
 
A. Describe multispecies / mixed fisheries: the biology and ecology of the species concerned 
and the fishery itself; 
 
B. Using representative fisheries case studies in each region, identify the species acting as 
choke, describing and assessing the use of all the CFP tools to mitigate the risks of these species 
choking fisheries; the community and international quota swaps and the productive and 
commercial strategies; identifying EU underutilized quotas of species acting as choke; and 
assessing whether traditional swaps help to reduce any deficits between catches and quotas; 
 
C. to assess whether the tools in the CFP are technically adequate and sufficient to implement 
the landing obligation and the reasons why some are being currently underutilised; 
 
D. Considering future scenarios after 2019 following full implementation of the landing 
obligation and the future of the EU with 27 Members States or any other likely scenario (i.e. 
Climate change), make predictions about the impact of the problems both biological, economic 
and social and the efficiency / sufficiency of EU actions and instruments to mitigate effects of 
the landing obligation. Identify alternative solutions: (e.g. redistribution of quotas underused; 
adjustments to the TAC and quota system; or any other viable solutions). 
 
GENERAL INFORMATION 
It is emphasised that this study deals exclusively with the landing obligation and choke 
species in demersal fisheries in the North Sea, and does not address the issues in the pelagic 
and industrial fisheries. The main findings are:  
 
Regarding Objective A. Describe multispecies / mixed fisheries: the biology and 
ecology of the species concerned and the fishery itself, the chapter 2 starts with a brief 
theoretical and historical perspective on the fundamental methodological challenges 
linked to accurately defining fisheries, because of the diversity in individual fishing 
strategies resulting in great variability in fishing patterns and catch composition. 
Depending on the question asked, on the aggregation criteria and scale chosen, and on the 
dataset used, different categorisations of fisheries might be defined. In the recent years though, 
a consensus on a standardised way to describe global North Sea demersal fisheries 
has emerged in the aftermath of the cod recovery plan in 2008, and has also been the 
cornerstone of the fisheries-based gradual phasing-in of the landing obligation 
between 2016 and 2019. Some general description on these various fisheries is provided, 
together with information on the stocks they exploit either as target or as bycatch. The state 
of the stocks has on average significantly improved in the North Sea during the last 
decade, largely related to better fisheries management and a decrease in fishing effort 
rather than to an increase of biological productivity. 
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Regarding Objective B, identify the species acting as choke, the chapter 3 reviews a 
number of studies that have been performed on the topic, which has received particularly 
strong focus in 2017 in various fora. Real choke issues have not been really observed 
yet in the North Sea, so analyses are only able to address potential risks if and when the 
landing obligation is fully and strictly enforced. The landing obligation has triggered the 
need to characterise the various potential choke situations and assess the factors causing 
them, in order to identify the most appropriate mitigation strategies. Importantly, 
different choke categories apply to various North Sea stocks, and different situations may 
be experienced at EU, Member State, Fleet and Individual vessel levels, depending on 
access to quota and market. The most serious potential risks of choke situations for the 
main commercial stocks are estimated to be with Northern hake in trawl fisheries and with 
North Sea plaice in small-meshed beam trawl fisheries, but for very different reasons. 
For hake, this is linked to changes in the stock distribution, with increasing abundance in 
the North Sea while Member States, and UK in particular, have low quota share. The issue is 
thus linked to the historical relative stability key not being aligned with biological 
changes in the ecosystem, not least in relation to climate change. For plaice, this is 
linked to the large catches of undersized plaice in the sole fisheries.  
 
Regarding Objective C, assess whether the tools in the CFP are technically adequate 
and sufficient to implement the landing obligation, Chapter 4 reviews the various policy 
changes that have occurred since 2015 in the aftermath of the landing obligation. In the North 
Sea, the landing obligation has been phased in on a fishery-by-fishery basis. Several 
major stocks and fisheries were phased in in 2017, but the resulting outcomes in terms of 
estimated discards were not yet available at the time of writing this study. Beyond the discard 
plan foreseen by the CFP, a number of other policy changes were implemented, includes 
TAC removals, reductions in minimum landing size and changes in prohibited species 
among others. No major implementation issues have yet been reported by Member States, 
indicating that these CFP tools have until now been sufficient to allow the fisheries to 
continue operating under the landing obligation. However, it is also reported that the 
landing obligation has so far had no significant impact on the way fishing is 
conducted, and the objective of reducing unwanted catches has not yet been met. By 
providing more flexibility, the policy changes may thus have also reduced the 
incentives to improve selectivity. It is suggested that better management actions need 
to be catalysed, for example in the form of a top-down process whereby failure to 
effectively implement at least some measures incentivising discard reduction would 
preclude MS from being able to apply for the use of other policy tools. 
 
Regarding Objective D, the future scenarios after 2019, Chapter 5 builds on most of the 
conclusions reached in chapters 3 and 4. In 2019, all regulated species will have to be phased-
in, including the difficult cases mentioned in Chapter 3. Some reflections are given on the 
possible options for undersized plaice catches in the sole fishery. The current state of 
knowledge does not point to easy selectivity or avoidance options, and survival, while 
significant, is likely not “very high”. Considering the high biomass and sustainable state of the 
stock, some level of flexibility might thus be considered against e.g. provision for fully 
documented fisheries and sustained efforts to increase selectivity. For hake and other 
species showing distributional changes in relation to climate change, the success of the 
landing obligation is highly dependent on Member States’ voluntary quota swaps. Stable 
political solutions should be sought to address this issue on a more permanent and 
long-term oriented basis, especially in the context of Brexit. Considerations are also given 
on management issues for sharks and rays, which combine specific characteristics of being 
sensitive but valuable bycatches, and for which no simple management option seem to 
offer an adequate balance between exploitation and conservation in the landing 
obligation scheme. Secondly, alternative approaches to incentivise discard reductions are 
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discussed. The landing obligation as it now appears like a system that has “neither a stick nor 
a carrot”. An effective implementation of a ban on discarding requires high levels of at-sea 
monitoring and effective control, and/or strong incentives to fish more selectively, neither of 
which currently apply. Fully Documented Fisheries with Remote Electronic Monitoring, 
together with a smarter use of TAC top-ups can be the fundament of a results-based 
management system focusing on impact and controllability, where fishers are fully 
accountable of their catch. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The landing obligation (LO), the requirement to land all catches of certain fish species, was 
introduced as part of the EU’s new Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) in 2014 (European Parliament 
and Council of the European Union, 2013). However, the history of the EU discard policy 
started several years earlier, when the Commission published in March 2007 a 
communication recognising the serious problem of discarding in European fisheries (Borges, 
2015).  
 
By many ways, the evolution of the EU discard policy has been driven by the situation 
experienced in the North Sea demersal fisheries. There has long been a striking contrast 
between the situation in the EU waters, where discards rates have historically been estimated 
to be among the highest in the world (Kelleher, 2005), and the situation in the Norwegian 
waters where a discard ban had been in place since 1987 (Diamond and Beukers-Stewart, 
2011).  
 
An incident involving a UK trawler in North Sea’s Norwegian waters in 2008 generated public 
pressure to end discarding. Later in 2010, it is again in the North Sea that the public campaign 
of the UK celebrity chef known as “Hugh’s Fish Fight” prompted a very strong public reaction. 
The campaign mainly highlighted just one cause of discards, the quotas, blaming the EU 
management system and its perceived draconian and ineffective measures. Ultimately, the EU 
landing obligation emerged out of this strong emotional context, but after having been in 
question for a long time (Borges, 2015; Fitzpatrick and Nielsen, 2016)(Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Evolution of the EU’s Landing Obligation 2007-2015 
 
Source: (Fitzpatrick and Nielsen, 2016) 
 
The landing obligation represents probably the most important paradigm shift in the history 
of the Common Fishery Policy. When discarding is allowed, fishing is driven by 
maximising the value of the fraction of the catch that can be landed. When discarding 
is banned, fishing becomes also driven by minimising the quantity of the fraction of 
the catch that cannot be landed. This means that fishers become accountable for their 
entire catches of regulated stocks, and not of their landings only. Changing this fundamental 
approach to the way fishers drive their business requires a major change in mindset, which 
can only take place if fishers supports its legitimacy. 
 
Additionally, the transition costs of this paradigm shift are real. Discarding is an invisible 
externality cost for fishermen and society, which becomes internalised when discarding is 
banned. Even in a situation where fishermen would not be limited in their access to fishing 
quotas, a landing obligation makes fishing less cost-effective in the short-term, both by 
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increasing the costs (more trips back to harbour; more work for the crew; more infrastructures 
needed) and reducing the value of the catch (less valuable species and sizes; lower quality). 
But this situation worsens when limiting quotas add “choke issues” to this complex picture.  
 
As a consequence of these two aspects, banning discards is a difficult measure. A number 
of countries have already implemented discards, including Canada, New Zealand, Norway, 
Iceland and Chile, and experiences with these countries have been reviewed (Condie et al., 
2014; Borges et al., 2016). All cases show that the implementation of discard bans 
requires high levels of at-sea monitoring and effective control, and/or strong 
incentives to fish more selectively, neither of which applied in most cases examined. They 
also show that progresses were slow, with the Iceland taking 30 years to move into a mindset 
of full utilisation of all catches (Viðarsson et al., 2015). 
 
In spite of a general improvement in the state of the stocks and in the economic 
viability of the fisheries in the North Sea following a decade of strengthened fisheries 
management, it is obvious that these inherent difficulties also apply to the North Sea demersal 
fisheries. Since the early steps of establishing a knowledge baseline and defining roles and 
responsibilities in the new frame of the regionalised CFP in 2014 (Quirijns and Pastoors, 2014), 
many things have changed in the governance of the North Sea fisheries, although no effects 
on actual discards rates and fishing practices have yet been observed (STECF, 2018).  
 
The overall objective of the present study is thus to describe and assess the real problem of 
multispecies and mixed fisheries in the North Sea, now and after 2019. Based on an extensive 
literature review, we identify choke species that have the potential to limit catches, and discuss 
whether the CFP contains effective and sufficient tools to deal with such issues and to allow 
implementation of the landing obligation. 
 
It is emphasised that this study deals almost exclusively with the landing obligation and 
choke species in demersal fisheries in the North Sea, and does not address in details the 
issues in the pelagic and industrial fisheries. There are some specific risks of demersal bycatch 
choking these fisheries, and care is indeed needed in the use of bycatch thresholds and 
interspecies flexibility to address these (STECF, 2017a). The problematics in these fisheries are 
however not directly comparable with those in the demersal ones, so a choice was made by the 
author to restrict the scope of this report to the demersal fisheries.  
 
There is quite a lot of information available on the landing obligation in the North Sea, but it is 
largely dispersed across numerous sources. Beyond peer-reviewed scientific papers published 
in scientific journals, a lot of the information presented in the report is extracted from reports 
and grey literature including primarily: 
 
 Reports and advice from the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES, 
www.ices.dk) 
 Reports from the EU Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF, 
https://stecf.jrc.ec.europa.eu/reports) 
 Deliverables from the EU Horizon 2020 Research Project DiscardLess 
(http://www.discardless.eu/).  
 
Most of this information is publicly available, although it is not always straightforward to 
navigate into this amount of information and to know what to find where. Some reports 
mentioned in the text were however still unpublished at the time of writing this review, in 
particular the work by (Borges et al., 2018) and by (Fitzpatrick and Nielsen, 2018). Their 
relevant results were however integrated after agreement with the authors. This agreement is 
gratefully acknowledged. 
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2. THE NORTH SEA DEMERSAL MIXED FISHERIES 
KEY FINDINGS 
 The North Sea is a large sea basin containing a number of habitats and distinct 
regions. This influences the range of species of fish that are present and their 
distributions, which in turns lead to a great variety of activities prosecuted by several 
countries.  
 There are numerous studies and different sources of data providing qualitative and 
quantitative information on the North Sea demersal fisheries. Differences between them 
may occur according to different criteria and scale used for classification. A 
combination of physical descriptors (gear, mesh size) and resulting outcomes 
(target species, catch composition) can provide an accurate description. 
 Different countries operate different fisheries with different catch composition, leading 
thus to marked differences in targeting and discard rates 
 The state of the main commercial stocks has been improving in the recent years 
in the greater North Sea.  
 
The North Sea is a large sea basin containing a number of habitats and distinct regions resulting 
from its bathymetry, topographical features and hydrography. The variety of habitats and 
environmental conditions over the area influences the range of species of fish that are present 
and their distributions. This in turn has given rise to the development over time of a variety of 
fisheries prosecuted by fleets from a number of countries using a variety of gear types. The 
extent to which different countries participate in the various fisheries depends to a large extent 
on national quotas available to them (Quirijns and Pastoors, 2014). 
 
There are numerous ways to describe fisheries, and even defining what the wording 
“fisheries” means is not straightforward. Before proceeding with the actual description of 
North Sea fisheries in section 2.2, I recall a number of key concepts and explain the 
challenges linked to their characterisation and their quantification in section 2.1.  
2.1. Basic concepts and fundamental definition challenges  
It is important to highlight the difficulties and challenges linked to using the word “fisheries” 
itself. Inherently, the idea of “fishery”, “fleet” or “métiers” are concepts that one can 
qualitatively agree on, as it is obvious that different types of fishing activities performed by 
different types of fishing vessels using different types of gears will result in different types of 
impacts on the ecosystem and marine resources.  
 
Nevertheless, issues arise when trying to quantitatively define what these activities really 
are, and to allocate fishing units to the various categories. There are indeed many ways by 
which fishing activities can be considered alike or different from each other. In short, 
two main issues arise when comparing fishing activities: 1) which comparison criteria to use 
and 2) which scale.  
 
Here below we briefly recall the definitions of concepts and summarise the challenges linked to 
these two questions. 
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2.1.1. Concepts 
“Fishery” is a rather vague wording. According to the definition of the Food and Agriculture 
Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), a fishery is: “A unit determined by an authority or 
other entity that is engaged in raising and/or harvesting fish. Typically, the unit is defined in 
terms of some or all of the following: people involved, species or type of fish, area of water or 
seabed, method of fishing, class of boats and purpose of the activities.” 
 
Other terms have thus been more clearly defined. The European Data Collection Framework 
(DCF, (EC, 2008a)) defined two concepts, which we adopt for this report:  
 
 A fleet (or fleet segment) is a group of vessels with the same length class and 
predominant fishing gear during the year. Vessels may have different fishing activities 
during the reference period, but might be classified in only one fleet segment.  
 
 A métier is a group of fishing operations targeting a similar (assemblage of) species, 
using similar gear, during the same period of the year and/or within the same area and 
which are characterized by a similar exploitation pattern.  
 
In this report, we will thus use the specific word “fleet” or “fleet segment” when we refer to a 
group of vessels, and “métier” when we describe the fishing activity(ies) in which the fleet 
engages in. Fleets are linked to métiers through the fleets’ effort patterns, and métiers are 
linked to species/stocks through the catchability pattern (Figure 2). The term “fishery”, when 
used, will rather refer to a metier, unless otherwise specified. 
 
Fleets and métiers are only aggregations of multiple individual operations and vessels 
operated by humans. As such, they are not natural entities that are pre-defined and for 
which is it easy and clear to know who belongs to which group. Under the type of simple stock-
based TAC management that has long prevailed in the North Sea fisheries, no unique pre-
agreed classification exists as this was not required for implementing management. The 
first fisheries-based management actions are rather recent, include the implementation of effort 
management in the last decade (see section 2.1.2), and the current discard plans for the 
gradual implementation of the landing obligation (see section 4.1). Another exception is the 
case of e.g. MSC certified “fisheries”, or similar labelling, for which it is necessary to delineate 
which vessels and activities are allowed to use the label on their products. Already there the 
point is clear that different fisheries definitions might have been used across all these cases.  
Fisheries-based approaches require thus the definition of units (fleets and/or métiers), as 
well as of quantifiable rules to populate fishing trips into métiers and fishing vessels into 
fleets. 
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Figure 2.  Conceptual diagram of the links between fleets, métiers and species in a 
mixed-fishery context 
 
Source: (Ulrich et al., 2012)  
2.1.2. Which criteria to define fleets and metiers? 
A lot of scientific studies have been conducted over the last 25 years to provide robust definition 
analysis (Marchal, 2008; Deporte et al., 2012). Fisheries can be defined according to either 
trip inputs (available records of the technical features of fishing trips, e.g. gear and mesh size 
used, fishing grounds visited, season etc) or trip outputs (empirical or statistical analyses of 
landings or catches composition in weight or in value, called “catch profiles”). Combined 
methods relate catch profiles (outputs) to fishing trip characteristics (inputs). 
 
In the North Sea, both types of approaches have been used, for different purposes. Inputs-
based definitions have been used in the effort management regimes in place during the 
period 2003-2008 (EC, 2004) and 2009-2016 (EC, 2008b; Kraak et al., 2013). Categories 
(métiers) for days at sea limits were defined in terms of gear type and cod-end mesh size 
combinations, known as e.g. TR1, TR2, BT1, BT2 (see further below), together with several 
additional possible “Special conditions”. Inputs-based definitions are also used in the Annual 
Economic Report (AER, (STECF, 2017b)), where fleet segments are defined according to vessel 
size and main gear, and these broad categories can include very different vessels and 
activities within a group. 
 
Combined/output-based methods have been used in the DCF for the scientific sampling 
of biological data, where métiers have been defined according to a hierarchical structure 
using six nested levels of which level 5 relates to the “Target assemblage” based on main 
species type (e.g. Demersal fish vs. Crustaceans or Cephalopods). For example, the main 
bottom trawl fishery will be coded OTB_DEF_>=120_0_0, which means “Bottom trawl with 
Otter boards_targeting demersal fish assemblage_with mesh size in cod end above 120 mm_no 
selective panel in trawl_no selective device in codend.” 
 
Substantial difficulties are however linked with both approaches (Ulrich et al., 2012). Input 
information such as gear and area can link to very different types of fisheries, and 
mesh size is not always a good descriptor, even when it is accurately recorded. In the 
North Sea, a good example of this is given by the vessels targeting almost exclusively saithe, 
in comparison with the more mixed roundfish fisheries were saithe is caught together with e.g. 
cod, haddock and whiting, although the same gear and mesh size are recorded in the logbooks 
(TR1, bottom trawl with >= 100 mm codend meshsize). Or similarly, bottom trawls with mesh 
size less than 100 mm (TR2) can target both Norway lobster or whiting. This lack or 
Fleet (vessel) Métier (trip) Species (catches)
EFFORT CATCHABILITY
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relationships between the recorded mesh size and the catch composition is demonstrated to be 
even more problematic in the Celtic Sea than in the North Sea (ICES, 2017a) 
 
Conversely, interpreting output information such as catch composition is further hampered by 
a number of recurrent questions such as: Should analyses be performed based on tonnage or 
value? What defines a target or a by-catch species, and are some species target for some 
fleets and bycatch for others? Are catches different from the landings and why, and is 
landings composition changing according to regulations and access to quota? Do catch 
composition reflect the true intention and perfect local knowledge from the fisher? Etc.  
 
In summary, there is not a unique and simple set of criteria that can be universally 
used to define fleets and fisheries, and the final choice of criteria is linked to the 
question asked and the availability of information. 
2.1.3. Which scale? 
The question of scale is just as difficult to answer. In reality, each vessel (and each trip or 
haul, respectively) is unique in terms of catch rate, fishing type, profitability, incentives, 
fishing strategies etc.. Ultimately, two fishers from the same harbour fishing in the same way 
may have quite different catch composition. And two consecutive hauls from the same vessel 
can yield very different outcomes (Mortensen et al., 2018).  
 
As such, fisheries will only be aggregations of these unique events, and their average 
patterns will be dependent of the chosen scale of aggregation. Like a fractal or a snowflake, 
differences will appear when zooming in within a fishery, with catch composition varying 
according to e.g. season, fishing place, home harbour, vessel size, skipper etc. Defining 
fisheries requires thus a trade-off to be made between the number of fisheries units 
defined and their internal consistency and homogeneity.  
2.2. Fisheries in the North Sea 
2.2.1. Standard terminology 
As explained above and later below, several definitions of North Sea fisheries have historically 
been used in different documents, for different purposes and a different scales. In the most 
recent years though, a common approach has been to refer to the broad categories 
defined in the cod management plan (Council Regulation 1342/2008, (EC, 2008b)). The 
greater North Sea is described as management area 3b in annual Annex IIa of the TAC and 
Quota Regulations (e.g. Council Regulation 40/2013). The greater North Sea can be further 
subdivided into: 
 
 3b1 - Skagerrak (ICES area IIIaN) 
 3b2 - North Sea (ICES area IV and EU waters of ICES area IIa) 
 3b3 - Eastern channel (ICES area VIId)1 
 
The following definitions for regulated gears are used: 
 
 Bottom trawls and seines (OTB, OTT, PTB, SDN, SSC, SPR) of mesh: 
TR1 equal to or larger than 100 mm, 
TR2 equal to or larger than 70 mm and less than 100 mm, 
TR3 equal to or larger than 16 mm and less than 32 mm; 
 
                                           
1  However the area VIId is now not included in the discard plan for the North Sea, but for the North-Western Waters. 
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 Beam trawls (TBB) of mesh: 
BT1 equal to or larger than 120 mm 
BT2 equal to or larger than 80 mm and less than 120 mm  
 Gill nets, entangling nets (GN) 
 Trammel nets (GT) 
 Longlines (LL)  
2.2.2. Datasets and sources of information available 
In the frame of this report, a number of datasets and sources of information on North Sea 
mixed fisheries can be used. Given the quantity and complexity of fisheries data, a recurrent 
issue has been that the various databases and sources of information might not be fully 
consistent and coherent with each other.  Even though they largely come from the same 
raw data (log-books, sale slips, harbor and onboard sampling programs), datasets are compiled 
and aggregated by different people in different institutions and for different purposes, and using 
different criteria and scales. As such, differences might occur, although increased collaboration 
and transparency in the data collection processes have significantly contributed to reducing 
these over the last decade.  
 
Here we briefly present the key sources of scientific information available to describe North Sea 
fisheries. 
2.2.2.1. STECF FDI data 
The FDI2 (Fisheries-Dependent Information) database has been established by STECF 
(Scientific, Technic and Economic Committee for Fisheries for the European Commission) and 
maintained by the JRC (Joint Research Center). It was initially developed to monitor fishing 
effort in areas covered by fishing effort limitations, and progressively extended. Data are 
collected through a data call. The most recent dataset includes catch (landings and discards) 
and effort data for all EU fleets between 2003 and 2016 (STECF, 2017c), disaggregated at the 
level of Member States and “Regulated Gear” according to the corresponding effort regime.  
 
Additionally, data are also separated according to vessel size, distinguishing between vessels 
<10m, between 10 and 15m, and above 15m. A great number of species are included in the 
data call. Discard estimates are calculated automatically on the basis of the samples available, 
and their reliability can thus vary considerably (STECF, 2013).  
 
This database is the primary source of information used in the Discard Atlas of the North 
Sea fisheries (Quirijns and Pastoors, 2014) as well as in all following studies emitted by e.g. 
STECF and NSAC. 
2.2.2.2. STECF AER data 
Catch and effort data are also available as the result of the DCF data call 2017 to support the 
analysis carried out during the STECF Expert Working Group on 'Annual Economic Report on 
the EU Fishing Fleet’ (STECF, 2017b). The AER database also maintained by the JRC3. Catch 
data are landings in weight and in value (no discards data), by fleet segment (country, main 
gear and vessel size) and gear from 2008 to 2016. The vessel size classes are different from 
the FDI database above.  
 
Over the years, significant efforts have been dedicated to improve the coverage and quality 
of both JRC databases (FDI and AER), and to adapt them to the changing data needs. 
In particular, management has moved from a focus on fishing effort in the context of the 
recovery plans to a focus on discards in the context of the EU landing obligation, and this 
                                           
2  https://stecf.jrc.ec.europa.eu/dd/effort  
3  https://stecf.jrc.ec.europa.eu/dd/fleet  
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requires a different breakdown of catch categories from the usual landings and discards. Also, 
there is a need to link the two databases in order to combine economic data by fleet and 
catch data by métier and standardize data by fishery/métier. From 2018 a new FDI database 
will be launched, reflecting these changes. 
2.2.2.3. ICES MIXFISH data 
ICES has provided mixed-fisheries advice for the North Sea demersal fisheries since 
2009, focusing on the main target species cod, haddock, whiting, saithe, plaice, sole, and 
Norway lobster. 
 
Catch and effort data for all North Sea countries (including Norway) are collected annually 
through a data call and compiled by the ICES WGMIXFISH Expert Group (ICES, 2017a). 
Fisheries definitions have been constructed empirically in a way that 1) distinguishes between 
fleet segments and métiers; 2) is consistent with both the DCF métiers definitions and Annex 
IIA of (EC, 2008b) regulated gears above; 3) uses aggregated fleet segments consistent with 
the AER definitions; and 4) provides catch composition (in species and size) fully consistent 
with the single-stock assessment. Discards by fleet and métier are estimated manually by the 
various stock assessors using the ICES DataBase InterCatch, on the basis of the sampled data 
provided by national data submitters.  
 
The dataset represents an exhaustive source of information on fishing activities, but is not 
publicly available, and cannot be used for other purposes than those agreed with ICES. The 
data are however available to the author of this report as being a member of the expert Group. 
2.2.3. Description of the mixed fisheries in the Greater North Sea Ecoregion 
The previous chapters have explained the complexity of defining what “mixed-fisheries“ 
means, and the multicity of the sources of information. They have underlined that describing 
mixed-fisheries in the North Sea is not an easy task, as it can be addressed in many different 
ways and at several scales.  
 
ICES has recently engaged in a similar process of describing the main fisheries in the various 
ecoregions, summarizing a vast knowledge into a short and synthetic overview. Such a 
description has already been published for the North Sea (ICES, 2017b). The following chapter 
is thus largely extracted from this ICES overview, combined with elements extracted from other 
sources including the Discard Atlas (Quirijns and Pastoors, 2014). 
2.2.3.1. General Overview 
The definition of Greater North Sea is unclear and can vary according to documents. For (ICES, 
2017b), The Greater North Sea ecoregion includes the North Sea, English Channel, Skagerrak, 
and Kattegat (Map 1), although most of the Kattegat stocks are actually assessed together with 
the Baltic Sea stocks and the Western Channel stocks are assessed together with the Celtic Sea 
ecoregion. This definition differs from the one used in the EC Mixed fisheries management plan 
(EC, 2016), the EC discard plan (EU, 2018), and the North Sea Advisory Council area, which 
includes only the Union waters of ICES zones IIa, IIIa and IV, but not the English Channel (area 
VIId-e) which belongs to the NorthWestern Waters.  
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Map 1:  The Greater North Sea ecoregion (in yellow) as defined by ICES. The 
relevant ICES statistical areas are shown 
 
Source:(ICES, 2017b) 
Note:ICES uses standard numbering (e.g. 3a, 4b) for area definitions with while most EU legal documents use Roman 
numbering (e.g. IIIa, IVb) 
 
Around 6600 vessels from nine nations operate in the Greater North Sea, with the largest 
numbers coming from UK, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, and France. Since 2003, total 
fishing effort has declined (Figure 3). Conversely, the profitability of many of the 
commercial fleets has increased in recent years (STECF, 2017b) due to the improved 
status of many fish stocks, reduced fleet sizes, lower fuel prices, and more efficient fishing 
gears.  
 
A few countries have important pelagic and industrial fisheries which account for the largest 
proportion of the total landings (Figure 4); however, these are usually less mixed that the 
demersal fisheries, although bycatch of demersal species occur. These bycatch can create 
important choke issues, but this is not dealt with in this report which focuses on demersal 
fisheries. 
 
Figure 3  Greater North Sea fishing effort (thousand kW days at sea) in 2003–2015, 
by gear type (LL = longlines) 
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Figure 4  Commercial landings (thousand tonnes) from the Greater North Sea in 
2003–2015, by gear type (LL = longline) 
 
Source:(ICES, 2017b).  
Note: The categories and data source for figures 3 and 4 are identical, but the colours are ordered by importance and 
differ thus across the two figures 
 
The fisheries of the North Sea are highly complex. Vessels use a variety of fishing 
equipment and their catches consist of a mix of different species. Otter trawl and beam 
trawls are the main gears used in the region’s demersal fisheries, though with 
regional differences (Figure 5). There is a dominance of flatfish beam trawl fisheries in the 
southern North Sea, and a dominance of gadoids and other demersal trawl fisheries in the 
Northern North Sea. There are also important shellfish fisheries in several areas, with Norway 
lobster (Nephrops) as the most important target species.  
 
 
Figure 5.  Spatial distribution of average annual fishing effort (mW fishing hours) in 
the Greater North Sea during 2012–2015, by gear type. Fishing effort data 
are only shown for vessels >12 m having vessel monitoring systems 
(VMS). 
 
Source:(ICES, 2017b).  
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2.2.3.2. Description of the main mixed fisheries 
This chapter provides a more detailed description of the various types of fisheries in the Greater 
North Sea, highlighting mixed-fisheries issues in relation with the landing obligation. This 
chapter combines text directly extracted from both (Quirijns and Pastoors, 2014) and (ICES, 
2017b). The main countries involved in the named fisheries are mentioned. 
 
Bottom otter trawl and seine fisheries 
 
Otter trawls are the most common gear types in the Greater North Sea and are used intensively 
in most parts of the region, including the Skagerrak and the English Channel. Otter trawls 
typically catch gadoids, other groundfish, plaice, and Nephrops; however, the species 
composition of the catch depends on the area and depth fished and the gear design, 
including codend mesh size. Bottom seine fisheries operate mainly in the Skagerrak, central 
North Sea, and in the eastern English Channel, with limited effort in the northern North Sea. 
Mesh sizes and targeted species are largely similar to the otter trawl fisheries in these areas, 
and these two gears are thus also often considered and regulated together. 
 
TR1 (mesh size >=100 mm) 
In the northern North Sea and the Skagerrak, otter trawls operate primarily with mesh sizes 
greater than 100 mm. They target primarily roundfish, but at least three different fisheries 
operate within this gear category: 
 
1. A mixed demersal fishery targeting cod and associated species (mainly haddock and 
whiting in the Western and Northern North Sea, mainly plaice in the South-eastern North Sea) 
with trawls and seines nets operates over much of the area indicated above. Of particular 
importance are the areas off Denmark, around Shetland and adjacent to the Norwegian Deeps. 
The main countries involved are Scotland, Denmark and Germany. 
 
2. A mixed fishery that is characterised by a greater preponderance of 'groundfish' species 
targeting in particular anglerfish and megrim. The main area of operation for this fishery is 
along the shelf edge at depths around 200 m and this fishery is particularly important in 
Scotland. 
 
3. A fishery for saithe, mainly to the far north of the North Sea area especially by French, 
German and Norwegian vessels. 
 
In recent years, the increasing population of hake is seasonally abundant in the North Sea. 
Hake is regularly caught in TR1 fisheries, particularly by type 2 and 3. The proportion of 
Nephrops landings from mesh sizes greater than 100 mm has also recently been increasing. 
 
TR2 (mesh size 70-100 mm) 
TR2 gear is more widespread than the TR1 gear and associated mainly with three fisheries. 
 
1. The fishery for Norway lobster (Nephrops). This species lives on areas of soft clay muds 
which are distributed patchily throughout the North Sea and Skagerrak. Bycatch limits for fish 
species apply in the smaller meshed (80-89 mm) Nephrops fishery. The bycatch limits do not 
create undue problems in inshore areas where fish abundance is low. In more northerly offshore 
areas where fish are more abundant, adhering to the bycatch limits is more challenging. The 
main nations involved are Scotland, England, Denmark and the Netherlands. 
 
2. A mixed fishery taking place in the more southerly parts of the North Sea and centred 
on the eastern Channel in which whiting and non-quota species are important constituents. 
This is predominantly a French fishery. 
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3. A 90-99 mm mesh mixed demersal fishery centred on the Skagerrak and prosecuted by 
Denmark and Sweden. In the Skagerrak, also a directed Nephrops fishery with sorting grid (70-
89 mm mesh size) is prosecuted by Swedish vessels. 
 
Beam trawl fisheries 
 
Two main beam-trawl categories operate in the North Sea, primarily in the shallow parts of the 
southern and central North Sea, with particularly intense activity off the southeast coast of 
England. Additionally, many small beam trawlers (< 24 m) target brown shrimp in the southern 
North Sea and coastal areas using a 20–25 mm codend mesh size. 
 
BT1 (mesh size >120 mm) 
The larger meshed BT1 beam-trawl gear is principally used in the plaice fishery of the Central 
and Eastern North Sea. Cod is also taken in this fishery. Denmark, Belgium and England mainly 
carry out this fishery. 
 
BT2 (mesh size between 80 mm and 120 mm) 
The BT2 gear (accounting for around 40% of all fishing effort in the North Sea) is mainly used 
in a fishery located in most Southerly parts of the North Sea and into the Channel. It is operated 
principally by the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany. The most important species for beam 
trawlers are sole and plaice in terms of value and volume, respectively and other flatfish (e.g. 
turbot and brill). Because of the small codend mesh size, this fishery catches significant 
quantities of fish below minimum sizes are caught, resulting in high discard rates. Part of this 
beam trawl fleet has changed its fishing practices in the recent years, shifting from conventional 
beam trawl to electric pulse trawl to reduce fuel costs, seabed impacts, and unwanted catches. 
 
Static gear fisheries (gillnet and longline) 
 
A number of fixed gears are employed in the North Sea, the most important being gill nets and 
trammel nets.  
 
1. The main gillnet activity (GN1) is from a Danish fishery targeted mainly at cod and 
plaice. The importance of anglerfish in this fishery has risen in recent years and activity directed 
at this species has increased by Scottish vessels. Discard rates in gillnet fisheries with larger 
mesh sizes ( >100 mm) are generally low; however, bycatch of marine mammals and seabirds 
occurs. 
 
2. Trammel net fisheries (GT1) are operated by a number of countries and are particularly 
important in more coastal waters, for example off the English North Sea and Channel coasts 
for sole. Catches of plaice and cod are also important particularly in the fishery operated by 
Denmark.  
 
3. Fairly small scale fisheries using longlines (LL) make catches of cod, hake and ling. 
 
Pelagic trawl and pelagic seine fisheries 
 
Pelagic trawl and seine fisheries operate throughout most parts of the North Sea, except in the 
eastern portion of the central North Sea. The small-meshed (< 32 mm codend) pelagic trawl 
fishery is prosecuted mainly by vessels >40 m from Denmark, Norway and targets sandeel, 
Norway pout, sprat, and blue whiting for reduction purposes. The pelagic trawl fishery for 
human consumption is operated by refrigerated seawater trawlers (>40 m) and freezer trawlers 
(>60 m) from the Netherlands, Denmark and Scotland and targets herring, mackerel, and horse 
mackerel. Some blue whiting is taken by these vessels in the northern North Sea. The pelagic 
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and industrial fisheries are more specialised typically targeting and catching predominantly one 
species at a time. 
 
Dredge fisheries using other gears (dregdes, pots etc) 
 
Most countries also have inshore fisheries prosecuted by under 10m vessels using a variety of 
gears (including pots, dredges etc.) for a variety of fish and shellfish species. Significant dredge 
fisheries for scallops occur in inshore areas along the east coasts of Scotland and England and 
throughout the English Channel. Dredges are also used to harvest blue mussels in the nearshore 
southern and eastern North Sea. These fisheries primarily occur on sand and gravel substrates 
and are affected by exclusion zones that protect sensitive habitats in some areas. Static gear 
pot fisheries, mainly for edible crab, lobster, and whelk operate in the inshore areas of several 
countries bordering the North Sea. 
2.2.3.3. Discards 
Discard data have been collected for some North Sea fisheries since the mid-1970s. Since 2000, 
discard data from North Sea commercial fisheries have been collected from various observers 
programmes implemented under the EU DCF. However, complete discard data are only 
available from 2012 onwards.  
 
A detailed analysis of the North Sea discards data was performed prior to the implementation 
of the landing obligation (Quirijns and Pastoors, 2014), using STECF FDI data. The conclusions 
are reported in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Overview on the discards in different areas and fisheries, average 2010-2012 
FISHERIES COMMENTS 
North Sea demersal fisheries On average 40% of the catch in weight was discarded (i.e. 
discard ratio) in the North Sea between 2010 and 2012 
with 78% of the discards coming from plaice and dab. 
Average discard ratios per species were highly variable, 
ranging from zero (e.g., megrim, blue ling) to over ninety 
percent (dab). 
North Sea pelagic and 
industrial fisheries 
Discard ratios are generally low for the pelagic fisheries 
and next to zero for industrial fisheries. However, no 
specific observer programmes are conducted on the 
pelagic and industrial fisheries in the North Sea. No 
information on slipping is available but can be substantial 
in certain seasons and areas. 
Skagerrak demersal fisheries The average discard ratio in the Skagerrak was 23% for 
the years 2010-2012. Discard ratios varied between 
species from very low percentages (i.e. anglerfish and 
turbot) to almost ninety percent (whiting). New gear 
regulations were introduced in national legislation 2013 by 
Denmark and Sweden, which can be expected to reduce 
the discard ratios in the future. 
Skagerrak pelagic and 
industrial fisheries 
Discard estimates are in general uncertain. No observer 
programmes are conducted on the pelagic and industrial 
fisheries. Slipping in pelagic fisheries is known and can in 
some season and areas be substantial. 
Policy Department for Structural and Cohesion Policies 
 
 
24 
Eastern Channel demersal 
fisheries 
Whiting, plaice and sole dominate the catches. Between 
10-40% of dab, plaice and lemon sole catches are being 
discarded. For many of the demersal species discard ratios 
varied by in some cases an order of magnitude between 
years. The quality of the discard information in the Eastern 
Channel is generally low. 
Easter Channel pelagic 
fisheries 
The main landings for pelagic species are herring and 
horse mackerel. For these species almost no discard 
information was available. 
Source: (Quirijns and Pastoors, 2014) 
 
Additional considerations on trends are found in (ICES, 2017b) (Figure 6). In 2012–2015, 
discard rates of demersal and crustacean species remained constant (7–10% and 15–20%, 
respectively, of the total catch of these species), while discards of benthic species declined 
sharply between 2014 and 2015 (40% to 25%). Discard rates of pelagic species were close 
to zero during 2012–2015. 
 
Figure 6.  Left panel (a): Discard rates in 2013–2016 by fish category, shown as 
percentages (%) of the total annual catch in that category. Right panel 
(b): Landings (green) and discards (orange) in 2016 by fish category (in 
thousand tonnes) 
 
Source:(ICES, 2017b).  
 
2.2.3.4. Summary 
North Sea fisheries are very diverse, and often very mixed (i.e. métiers catch several 
different species). Vessels may engage in several métiers over one year. As the lowest level 
of vessels aggregation, ICES WGMIXFISH uses a segmentation by country (nine categories), 
gear type (four categories), vessel length class (four categories), and with additional provision 
for Fully Documented Fleets. This led to a total number of 42 fleet segments in 2016 (ICES, 
2017a). These fleets engaged in one to five different métiers (different mesh size) and/or areas 
(including North Sea, Skagerrak or Eastern Channel) each, resulting in 105 combinations of 
fleet*métier*area targeting cod, haddock, whiting, saithe, plaice, sole and Nephrops, and 
catching also a great diversity of other bycatch. These numerous combinations can naturally 
be aggregated into fewer categories for easing the display and the interpretation of results. 
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The Figure 7 illustrates this diversity, emphasizing the number of target species caught by each 
fleet.  
 
Figure 7.  Technical interactions in the North Sea demersal fisheries for the main 
commercial stocks, based on 2014 catches by fleet aggregated over vessel 
length classes. The colour of arrows is proportional to the share of total 
catches by species taken by each fleet.  
 
 
 
WHG: Whiting; TUR: Turbot; SOL:  Sole; POK: Saithe; PLE: Plaice; NEP: Nephrops; HAD: 
Haddock; COD: Cod. 
Source: (Ulrich, 2016), ICES WGMIXFISH data 
2.2.4. Species exploited in the Greater North Sea 
2.2.4.1. Primary and secondary species 
As explained above, it is difficult to define objectively and quantitatively whether a 
species is a target species, a by-catch or something in between (target for some fleets, 
by-catch for some others). In reality, in the North Sea the main species are also largely those 
for which analytical assessments and MSY reference points usually exist, allowing for a 
rather straightforward dichotomy that is reflected in the regulations.  
 
The 2013 CFP (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2013) Article 15 lists 
for the North Sea the following nine species as “defining the fisheries”: cod (Gadus 
morhua), haddock (melanogrammus aeglefinus), whiting (Merlangius merlangus), saithe 
(Pollachius virens), Norway lobster (Nephrops norvegicus); common sole (Solea solea), plaice 
(Pleuronectes platessa); hake (Merluccius merluccius); Northern prawn (Pandalus borealis).  
 
Similarly, the North Sea mixed-fisheries management plan (EC, 2016) refers to ”Group 1” 
stocks including the main six species cod, haddock, plaice, sole, saithe and whiting. The 
European Parliament proposed to add anglerfish (Lophius spp.) and Northern prawn in that 
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list4, although the anglerfish does not have any MSY reference point defined yet. “Group 2” 
comprises all the stocks of Norway lobster in the North Sea.  
2.2.4.2. Biology, ecology and stock status 
There are many species exploited in the Greater North Sea. ICES assesses 120 stocks from 
72 species (ICES, 2017b). These species can be categorized according to their biology and 
ecology. These include: 
 
 Pelagic species: species living in the water column away from the ground. In the Greater 
North Sea, this category includes only small pelagics: herring, mackerel, horse mackerel, 
sprat, Norway Pout, sardine, blue whiting. These are usually caught in targeted 
monospecific fisheries, but by-catch of demersal species can occur to some extent 
 
 Demersal species: species living close to the ground. This is the largest category, with 23 
species assessed by ICES. The most important are cod, haddock, saithe, whiting and 
sandeel, but a number of other species are also caught, often in mixed-fisheries: grey and 
red gurnard, ling, pollack etc. Striped red mullet and seabream are caught mainly in the 
Channel rather the North Sea. Finally a few other stocks defined as demersal in the ICES 
Greater North Sea overview are less considered into mixed-fisheries interactions: 
Alfonsinos, Greater silver smet, blue ling, seabass, eel, greater forkbeard, orange roughy, 
grenadier, tusk 
 
 Benthic species: species living in direct contact with the ground. These include many 
important commercial species such as plaice, sole, anglerfish, megrim and four-spotted 
megrim, and many other species, some of them considered as important by-catches, such 
as brill, lemon sole, turbot, witch flounder, dab, flounder.  
 
 Crustaceans species: In the Greater North Sea, the main species is Norway lobster 
(Nephrops), which is found in several fishing grounds and is thus divided in several 
populations called “Functional Units” (FU). There are also fisheries for Northern prawn 
(Pandalus borealis) and grey shrimp (Crangon). Crustacean fisheries are usually associated 
with some degrees of bycatch of demersal and benthic fish. 
 
 Elasmobranchs. These include a variety of sharks (Angel shark, basking shark, dogfish, 
spurdog, tope shark, gulper shark, porbeagle) and skates/rays. There are many species of 
skates and rays, but these are not always well identified in the fisheries data (STECF, 
2017d). 
 
The status of many of the assessed stocks is globally improving in the Greater North 
Sea, with average fishing mortality getting close to Fmsy, and biomass levels being 
above threshold levels (ICES, 2017b; STECF, 2017e) (Figure 8). However, great variations 
exist between the individual stocks, and also from one year to the next. Additionally, it 
must be kept in mind that this positive development is almost exclusively due to the reductions 
in fishing effort following the cod plan (EC, 2008b), and not to an increase in the biological 
productivity in the North Sea since the recruitment of the main fish stocks has remained low.  
 
                                           
4 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P8-TA-2017-0357 
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Figure 8. Status of North Sea stocks relative to the joint distribution of exploitation 
(F/FMSY) and stock size (SSB/ MSY Btrigger)  
 
Note: [left panels, by individual stocks] and catches (triangles) / landings (circles) from these stocks in 2016 [right 
panels].The left panels only include stocks for which MSY reference points have been defined (MSY where available). 
Stocks in green are exploited at or below FMSY while the stock size is also at or above MSY Btrigger. Stocks in red are 
either exploited above FMSY or the stock size is below MSY Btrigger, or both. Stocks in grey have unknown/undefined 
status in relation to reference points. For full stock names, see Table A in Annex 1. Note: for clarity, only stocks with 
catches greater than 10 000 tonnes are shown in the “all stocks” panel. 
Source:(ICES, 2017b).  
 
Figure 9. Temporal trends in F/FMSY and SSB/MSY Btrigger for North Sea demersal 
stocks. Only stocks with defined MSY reference points are considered. 
 
Source:(ICES, 2017b).  
Note: Equivalent detailed plots for pelagic, benthic and crustacean stocks are displayed in (ICES, 2017b) 
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2.3. Conclusions on Objective A 
The North Sea demersal fisheries have been extensively studied and described in many 
documents, and there are many data available. The picture is complex, with many different 
nations, stocks and fisheries. The recent development of the fisheries is globally positive, 
with many stocks showing increased abundance and reduced mortality in the recent years, and 
fleets becoming increasingly profitable. However, there are many variations from stock to 
stock and from year to year, making it difficult to manage mixed-fisheries adequately. 
Discard rates have remained important in many fisheries.  
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3. CHOKE SPECIES IN THE NORTH SEA DEMERSAL 
FISHERIES 
This chapter addresses Objective B, requesting that “using representative fisheries case studies 
in each region, identify the species acting as choke, describing and assessing the use of all the 
CFP tools to mitigate the risks of these species choking fisheries; the community and 
international quota swaps and the productive and commercial strategies; identifying EU 
underutilized quotas of species acting as choke; and assessing whether traditional swaps help 
to reduce any deficits between catches and quotas”.  
KEY FINDINGS 
 The landing obligation has triggered the need to characterise the various potential 
choke situations and assess the factors causing them, in order to identify the most 
appropriate mitigation strategies. 
 Different choke categories may apply to various North Sea stocks, and different 
situations may be experienced at EU, Member State, Fleet and Individual vessel 
levels 
 The most serious risks of choke situations for the main commercial stocks are 
estimated to be with Northern hake in trawl fisheries and North Sea plaice in 
small-meshed beam trawl fisheries, but for very different reasons. Issues with hake 
are linked with the historical relative stability key not being aligned with 
biological changes in the ecosystem, not least in relation to climate change. Issues 
with plaice are linked to the large amount of small plaice caught in the sole fishery.  
 The potential choke effect of bycatch stocks has been less well studied so far. 
 The discussion on possible chokes is still speculative, as these will only be actually 
observed under conditions of full enforcement of the landing obligation. No such 
situation have yet been reported by Member States. 
 
The discussion about choke species in the North Sea is not new and the wording was already 
mentioned in the early days of the mixed-fisheries analyses (Ulrich et al., 2011), but has taken 
a much wider importance in the last years in the frame of the landing obligation (Fitzpatrick 
and Nielsen, 2018).  
 
A choke species is a species for which the available quota is exhausted (long) before the 
quotas are exhausted of (some of) the other species that are caught together in a (mixed) 
fishery (Zimmermann et al., 2015). 
 
In the North Western Waters, a lot of the most recent analyses and knowledge on choke issues 
have been centralized in the Choke Mitigation Tool (CMT) analyses5 initiated by the NWW 
Advisory Council. In the North Sea, the knowledge situation is slightly different. Much 
information is available about choke analyses, but in a rather dispersed form and in 
different places. Choke analyses have e.g. been performed by the NSAC, ICES, STECF, but 
also in numerous publications and reports produced by national fisheries institutes and by large 
scale research projects like the H2020 project DiscardLess6. They typically use a similar 
approach as the CMT, contrasting total catches (landing + discards) with available quota. We 
                                           
5  http://www.nwwac.org/publications/north-western-waters-choke-species-analysis-2016.2448.html  
6  http://www.discardless.eu  
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summarise here the findings from several analyses operating at different scales, and assess 
whether they provide similar perceptions regarding potential choke issues. 
 
3.1. Levels of choke issues 
An important milestone in the understanding of the problem has been the need to identify 
the various types of possible choke situations, and to characterise their causes and 
responsibility. It has been recognized that choke issues can potentially occur at various levels, 
depending whether the shortage of quota is due to a poor status of a stock or a poor distribution 
of fishing rights. The Advisory Councils (NSAC, 2017a) has developed a system for categorizing 
choke problems as follows:  
 
 Category 1: Sufficient quota at Member State level—choke is due to distribution within the 
Member State such that a region, a fleet segment or an individual vessel does not have 
enough but this can be resolved by the Member State itself. 
 Category 2: Sufficient quota at EU level, but insufficient quota at MS level—choke is due 
to a mis-match of catches and the distribution of quotas between Member States and can 
theoretically be resolved between themselves in a regional context. 
 Category 3: Insufficient quota at EU level—choke is due to insufficient quota within the 
relevant sea basin to cover present catches or catch levels that can be realistically reduced, 
resulting in a total stop of fishing for a Member State or Member States. 
 Category 4: Economic choking may occur at the vessel level when there is a considerable 
bycatch of a low value species and the boat is filled with fish that will not deliver a profit. 
 
The (NSAC, 2017a) did also acknowledge that that all parties, from the deck and wheelhouse 
of each fishing vessel, to the Commission, Member States and the co-legislators,  the European 
parliament and the Council, can contribute to prevent choke situations (Figure 10). 
 
Figure 10. Responsibilities preventing choke under the landing obligation 
 
Source:(NSAC, 2017a).  
 
14-1617 Managing Fisheries within the LO  NSAC is Supported by The European Commission 
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3.2. Initial considerations on quotas prior to landing obligation 
During its early considerations on the landing obligation, (STECF, 2014) investigated for which 
species and stocks each Member State had catches (landings + discards) in 2012 in excess of 
its initial and final quota (including swaps/banking etc.). Landings in excess of initial quota 
but not of final quota illustrated the dependency of MS on swaps to cover their fisheries, 
while catches in excess of final quota illustrated potential risks of choke species at Member 
State level.  
 
STECF underlined that the analysis presented was not predictive but was intended to flag 
potential issues to allow stakeholders to consider the tools available to reduce catch rates of 
these species so as to minimise risk of choking fisheries prematurely under the landing 
obligation. 
 
For the North Sea countries and stocks in 2012, the main results were as follows  
 
 Belgium No particular issues were observed for North Sea stocks; most problems were 
linked to stocks in NorthWest Waters 
 Germany 
o Cod catches in IIIa were well in excess of initial and final quota  
o Nephrops catches in IV were well in excess of initial quota although the final quota 
was able to cover all catches although quota/catches were small  
o Hake catches in IV were well in excess of initial and final quota 
 Denmark 
o Cod catches in IV and IIIa were in excess of initial quota and final quota 
o Megrim catches in IV were above the initial and final quota although catches were 
low 
o Hake catches in IV were in excess of initial and final quota and the initial quota is 
higher than the final quota 
o Haddock catches in IIIa were in excess of the initial and final quota 
o Saithe catches in IV were in excess of initial and final quota 
 France 
o In many cases catches were broadly in line with initial quota  
o Catches of hake in IV were well in excess of the initial quota but aligned to the final 
quota 
o Other issues reported by STECF were in Western Waters 
 Great-Britain 
o In many cases catches were broadly in line with initial quota  
o Catches of haddock in IV were in excess of initial quota but aligned with final quota  
o Catches of hake in IV were well in excess of initial and final quota  
o Catches of saithe in IV were in excess of initial and final quota  
o Other issues reported by STECF were in Western Waters 
 Netherlands 
o Catches of haddock in IV were in excess of initial quota and broadly in line with final 
quota 
o Catches of hake in IV were in excess of initial quota 
o Catches of Nephrops in IV were well in excess of initial quota and in excess of final 
quota 
o Catches of plaice in IV were well in excess of initial and final quota 
o Catches of whiting in IV were well in excess of initial and final quota 
 Sweden 
o Catches of anglerfish in IV were well in excess of initial and final quota although 
quota/catches were small 
o Catches of cod in IIIa were in excess of initial and final quota 
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o Catches of sole in IIIa were in excess of initial quota but broadly in line with final 
quota 
 
(STECF, 2014) concluded that these preliminary analyses demonstrated that for all Member 
States and for a number of primary and secondary (by-catch) stocks, catches in 2012 were 
well in excess of the available quota, and for some stocks, this was the case even after quota 
swaps and banking and borrowing. That means that while in many cases the landings were 
aligned with the landings quotas, TACs increases (topups) might not necessarily be sufficient 
to cover the discards of all Member States. 
 
3.3. Updated considerations on choke species by the North Sea 
Advisory Council and the Scheveningen Group 
 
In March 2017, the NSAC conducted an updated analysis of this, comparing available quota 
with 2015 landings and discards data for the main species (NSAC, 2017b). The aim was to 
classify the stocks according to the choke categories 1 to 4 above. The analysis was 
hampered by concerns on the validity of the discard estimates, but provides a useful overview. 
The outcomes of this analysis can be summarized in Table 2.  
 
Table 2. Summary of qualitative characterisation of potential choke effects 
STOCK / AREA CHOKE 
CATEGORY 
MAIN COUNTRIES 
/FLEET AFFECTED 
MITIGATION SUGGESTED / 
COMMENTS 
North Sea Cod  
(cf Figure 11) 
2  UK as a whole; 
Scotland 
Enhanced leasing and 
swapping  
North Sea Cod 1 France in TR2 De minimis 
Cod in Skagerrak 2 Sweden, Germany Improved selectivity 
Cod in Kattegat 2 or 3 Germany, Sweden, 
Denmark 
Improved selectivity. Levels of 
discards likely underestimated. 
Plaice in North 
Sea 
2/4 Netherlands, 
Belgium in BT2 
little success in finding proper 
mitigation measures yet 
Plaice in Kattegat 2 Germany Choke risk considered low 
Plaice in 
Skagerrak 
2 Sweden  
Saithe in North 
Sea* 
2 Scotland(UK), 
Denmark, Sweden 
little success in finding proper 
mitigation measures yet.  
Whiting in North 
Sea (cf Figure 
11) 
3 All Uncertainty in actual discard 
rates. little success in finding 
proper mitigation measures yet 
Source:(NSAC, 2017b)  
* Note from the author : For North Sea saithe, the concerns raised on the basis of the 2015 data do not apply anymore 
at the time of writing this report. A Significant TAC increase occurred in 2017, after an upward revision of the assessed 
stock status in 2016
7
.  
 
                                           
7  http://ices.dk/sites/pub/Publication%20Reports/Advice/2017/2017/pok.27.3a46.pdf  
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Figure 11.  Quota surplus/deficit per Member State compared to catches in 2015. 
Top: North Sea cod. Bottom: North Sea whiting 
 
Source:(NSAC, 2017b)  
Following this advice emitted by the NSAC, the Scheveningen Group of Member States agreed 
to postpone to 2019 the phasing-in of the landing obligation for North Sea plaice and Kattegat 
cod in some fisheries 8 
 
Northern hake is not considered to be a “species defining the fisheries” in the article 15 of 
(European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2013), and is only to be phased-in 
in 2019. Hake was thus not included in this NSAC study. However, potential issues linked to 
the recovery of the stock and its expansion in northern waters have long been flagged (Baudron 
and Fernandes, 2015), and generalized quota shortage for that stock across the North Sea was 
noted by the NSAC in its following advice (NSAC, 2017a).  
 
                                           
8  https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/binaries/rijksoverheid/documenten/publicaties/2017/05/31/joint-recommendation-
of-the-scheveningen-group-discard-plan-for-demersal-fisheries-in-the-north-
sea/NS+JR+demersal++discard+plan+2018.pdf  
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3.4. Scientific analyses identifying choke situations 
3.4.1. Regional level: ICES Mixed-fisheries advice 
 
ICES has pioneered the topic of choke analyses long before the landing obligation, having 
provided annual mixed-fisheries advice on the risks of constraining TACs and overquota 
discards since 2009 (ICES, 2017c). The analyses are performed using the data described in 
section 2.2.2.3 above, and the FCube methodology developed by (Ulrich et al., 2011). The 
principle is simple: One estimates the amount of fishing effort by fleet corresponding to the 
advised fishing opportunities for each stock assuming unchanged catchability. Then 
discrepancies between stock-specific effort estimates are interpreted as being indicative of risk 
of choke. This is illustrated in the so-called “Minimum” scenario (Figure 12): For each fleet, 
fishing effort in following year is simulated to stop when the most limiting of the stock shares 
of that fleet would be been caught up. This option is the most precautionary option, causing 
underutilization of the single-stock advice possibilities of other stocks. This scenario 
corresponds to assuming a strictly implemented discard ban without flexible mechanisms.  
 
From 2009 to 2015, the ICES mixed-fisheries choke analyses were strongly driven by 
North Sea cod, which clearly had a very restrictive quota and relatively high catchability, being 
caught by most demersal fleets. However, the cod stock has increased over the last few years, 
and the TAC as well. Over the last three years, fishing opportunities for North Sea whiting 
and haddock have then been estimated to be more constraining than for cod for a 
number of fleets. For example, for the 2018 advice (ICES, 2017c), ICES estimated that whiting 
fishing opportunities may limit 24 out of 42 fleet segments.  
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Figure 12. North Sea mixed-fisheries projections. Estimates of potential catches (in 
tonnes) by stock and by scenario.  
 
Note: Horizontal lines correspond to the single-stock catch advice for 2018. Bars below the value of zero show undershoot 
(compared to single-stock advice) where catches are predicted to be lower when applying the scenario. Hatched columns 
represent catches that overshoot the single-stock advice 
Source:(ICES, 2017c) 
 
Because of the concerns on hake, (ICES, 2016) had also analysed the impact of mixed fisheries 
scenarios on eight secondary North Sea stocks; brill, dab, flounder, hake, lemon sole, red 
mullet, turbot and witch flounder (Figure 13). All TACs of these stocks except the North Sea 
component of the hake TAC and turbot were predicted to be underutilized under assumption of 
status quo effort, while hake quota was predicted to be fully utilised under the ‘min’ scenario, 
and overutilised in all other scenarios, highlighting its potential as a ‘choke’ species for the 
fisheries.  
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Figure 13. Estimates of potential catch by secondary stock after applying Fcube 
scenarios.  
 
Note: Horizontal lines correspond to the single-stock catch advice. Bars below the value of zero show the scale of 
undershoot (compared to the single species catch advice) in cases where catches are predicted to be lower when applying 
the scenario. 
Source:(ICES, 2016) 
 
Until now, little guidance or request has been provided to ICES on specific issues or particular 
choke scenarios to be investigated, and the mixed-fisheries advice has mainly been driven by 
the exploratory investigations of the scientific modelers. As such, the analyses are for now only 
performed at the stock and fleet level, not at the Member State, contributing thus to information 
on choke categories 1 and 3 but not 2. Similarly, no analyses of CFP tools or alternative quota 
swaps have been performed. But discussions are currently ongoing with EU Commission to 
include additional considerations at Member State level in 2018, which may provide new policy 
insights.  
 
3.4.2. National level: choke analyses at fleet level within a Member State  
 
Beyond the ICES results, similar analyses have been performed to analyse choke issues within 
a Member State, investigating differences in fishing opportunities between fleet segments or 
POs. We illustrate here the results of two of these analyses, one in UK and one in Denmark. 
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3.4.2.1. UK 
 
The results below are extracted from (Russell et al., 2017) from the UK institute SEAFISH. The 
focus of the analysis presented in the report is on the likelihood that choke stocks could occur 
as a result of the landing obligation in five UK demersal fleet segments in 2017, 2018 and 2019 
and whether the movement of quota could delay the choke points identified. The quota 
movement studied are either a redistribution of the unused quota available in the UK 
(simulation S1) or a fixed allocation of previous levels of EU quota swaps (simulation 
S2).  
 
The results (Table 3) highlight some points of concerns for the Scottish fleets that dependent 
of the North Sea stocks (Area 4). While the internal redistribution of unused UK quota can help 
for some stocks (e.g. haddock), it appears clearly that the Scottish fleet, and in particular the 
whitefish trawl fleet is dependent of EU swaps for hake because of the low UK share.  
 
Table 3.  North Sea UK fisheries: Choke situation for each fleet segment in its main 
area of activity under the best-case quota simulation. 
Home-nation 
fleet 
segment 
Main 
Sea 
Area 
2015 
DAS in 
main 
sea 
area 
Best case 
simulation 
Under best-case simulation 
Year 
when 
choke 
point 
occurs 
Choke 
point 
as % 
of 
2015 
DAS 
Primary 
choke stocks 
that cause 
the choke 
point 
No of PO fleet 
segments in 
H-N fleet 
expected to 
encounter 
choke stocks 
Scotland 
nephrops 
trawl 
6 16,404 S1 2019 43% Anglerfish 
3 out of 4 that 
are active in 
Area 6 
4 8,838 
S1 
2017 81% 
Sole (only in 
4b TR2) 
4 out of 5 that 
are active in 
Area 4 
2018 52% 
Sole (only in 
4b TR2) and 
saithe 
4 out of 5 that 
are active in 
Area 4 
S2  2019 28% Hake 
4 out of 5 that 
are active in 
Area 4 
Scotland 
whitefish 
trawl 
4 9,662 S2 
2017 92% 
Sole (only in 
4b TR1) and 
cod 
4 out of 4 
2018 77% Saithe 4 out of 4 
2019 54% Hake 4 out of 4 
 
Source: (Russell et al., 2017), as summarized in H2020 DiscardLess 2nd Periodic Technical Report (unpublished)  
 
 
Incidentally, the SEAFISH model also show important choke effects in 2018 because of the 
predicted constraining effect of saithe TAC. The SEAFISH model is parameterized on 2015 data. 
However, as noted above in the footnote of Table 2, the ICES saithe assessment has been 
benchmarked in 2016, leading to a large increase in TAC in 2017. As such, saithe is no longer 
considered to be a potential choke stock (ICES, 2017c) 
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3.4.2.2. Denmark 
Two bioeconomic impact assessments have been performed, one for the short-term (Andersen 
and Ståhl, 2016) and one for the long-term (Hoff and Frost, 2017) consequences of the landing 
obligation for the Danish demersal fisheries. The short-term economic impacts of the landing 
obligation are calculated as changes between a full landing obligation implementation against 
a baseline without a landing obligation in 2013, without changes in fishing patterns. Several 
scenarios are analysed, investigating the effects of various CFP tools (quota uplift, changes in 
MCRS). The long-term analysis investigate the consequences of additional factors, including 
the effect of Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQ – in the form of Vessel Quota Share).  
 
A key finding of both analyses is that Danish demersal fleets seem on average little 
affected by the landing obligation if adequate top ups are provided. In the short-term 
scenarios (Andersen and Ståhl, 2016), the economic impact is almost neutral in these 
scenarios, or can even be a positive effect if MCRS for Nephrops is reduced (as it has happened 
in 2016). In the long-term scenarios (Hoff and Frost, 2017), the potential positive effects of 
the quota uplift are even larger (up to 5% increase in revenue) if a small de-minimis is allowed 
and when the vessels optimize their revenue by leasing extra quota, thus increasing the global 
quota uptake of the country.  
 
Differences between fleets occur though, and small and medium-sized trawlers are more 
affected than larger vessels, which are more flexible. The situation is also more positive in the 
North Sea than in the Skagerrak-Kattegat (Area IIIa), where discard rates of cod, Norway 
lobster and plaice are high. But overall, as it also appeared in the analyses presented in sections 
3.2 and 3.3, Denmark seems to have a better balance between its fishing opportunities and its 
catches in the North Sea (area 4) than many other Member States, and the risks of choke and 
severe negative economic impact seem limited. This positive situation can to a large extent be 
explained by the efficient trading system of individual quotas where unused quotas can 
easily be leased out within pools, although a part of the national quota still remain unfished for 
some species (Miljø- og Fødevareministeriet, 2016). 
3.4.3. Individual level: effects of limiting quota on the daily fishing choices 
The previous analyses have demonstrated how standard data and models can be used to predict 
the potential risk of chokes at the “broad brush” scale of a sea basin or a Member State. 
However, understanding these mechanisms at the scale of the individual fisherman is 
a much more complex issue. Skippers plan their daily tactics taking into account a large 
number of factors, including, but not only, their personal access to fishing quota. However the 
knowledge and data to perform analyses at that very fine spatio-temporal scale are largely 
missing. So the understanding of the actual mechanisms by which a limiting TAC 
constrains the daily choices of a skipper remains largely speculative. Some scientific 
models have tried to conceptualize these individual choke avoidance mechanisms. For example, 
(Batsleer et al., 2013) modelled that fishers may reallocate their effort to areas and weeks in 
which the choke species (cod in Eastern Channel in their case) catches are low, at the expense 
of lower revenue, provided that the landing obligation is fully and coercively enforced. In their 
model, a high fine (>20 times the sale price) was necessary to create a sufficient economic 
incentive to change fishing ground. 
 
To understand this more in-depth, (Mortensen et al., 2018) conducted qualitative interviews 
and quantitative analyses of the perception of choke issues with the owner and the skipper of 
a single Danish demersal trawl in the North Sea. The analyses were performed between 2013 
and 2015 at a time were the TAC for North Sea cod and North Sea saithe were very limiting. 
This study highlighted that saithe is distributed more patchily than cod, making it more difficult 
to predict its occurrence and avoid catching it. The fisher had thus to deploy a wide range of 
daily tactics to cope with its saithe catches, first by leasing additional quota if available and 
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affordable on the quota market, second by balancing the risks of saithe encounter with the 
gains of catching other valuable species distributed in the same areas as saithe, and in last 
resort, by changing target species and fishing areas away from saithe distribution grounds.  
 
While this study provided very interesting insights on the choices made by that single vessel, 
it also highlighted that its findings could likely not be generalized, and that a different skipper 
owing a different set of individual quota would likely experience different constraints and would 
deploy other avoidance approaches.  
 
This diversity of individual choke situations was investigated further as part of the H2020 
DiscardLess project, where numerous interviews were performed in a lot of different European 
fisheries (Reid, 2017)9. They highlighted some commonalities, but also some marked 
differences between fishers regarding their causes of discarding and the mitigation 
options they thought would work best for them.  
 
3.5. Conclusions on Objective B 
3.5.1. Main choke situations in the North Sea demersal fisheries 
Most available analyses of potential choke species issues have dealt with the main 
commercial stocks, and less with the effect of the secondary species that will enter the 
landing obligation in 2019. Out of the information gathered here, the most important cases 
appear to be: 
 
 Northern hake in TR1/TR2 fisheries, because of its recent expansion in the North Sea 
where most Member States have only small historical quota shares; 
 
 North Sea plaice in BT2 fisheries, because of the very large volume of undersized plaice 
caught in the sole targeted fishery; 
 
 North Sea whiting and Kattegat cod in all fisheries, because of their high discards rates.  
 
Noticeably, the two first choke cases are linked to stocks that are in a very good state, 
with high biomass levels and fishing mortality at Fmsy. For these two cases, choke issues 
are thus not of biological nature. But the issues for these two stocks are also diametrically 
different. For plaice, the problem is technical and economic; for hake, the problem is political, 
linked to the historical relative stability key being no more aligned with the spatial 
distribution of fish stocks in relation to climate change.  
 
These two issues are unlikely to be resolved by 2019, and alternative political solutions are 
required as discussed more in depth in chapter 5 (Objective D). For whiting (and also haddock 
in that category), the issue is more traditionally linked to the annual fluctuations of stocks and 
recruitment, and may more likely be addressed by the established policy tools in the frame of 
Article 15 and of the mixed-fisheries management plan, discussed in Chapter 4 (Objective C). 
Other potential choke situations have been identified, but with less dramatic expected impact 
and affecting a limited number of Member States. As mentioned earlier, choke analyses 
performed with data prior to 2016 would likely identify saithe as a potential choke stock, but 
this can be considered as an outdated problem after the upwards revision of the stock 
assessment in 2016.  
 
This summary combining qualitative and quantitative analyses is in line with the general 
perception of the NSAC, which stated in its latest advice (NSAC, 2017a) that “the existing 
                                           
9  http://www.discardless.eu/fishermen_story  
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toolbox is capable of dealing with most potential chokes for those species which are listed in 
Article 15 (1)(c) of the Basic Regulation. Two important exceptions appear to arise with: 
 
• Hake, where the stock development has out-stripped historic allocation arrangements, leading 
to a generalised shortage across the North Sea sea-basin; 
 
• Where scientific stock assessments underestimate the size of incoming year classes, causing 
an imbalance between fishing opportunities and quantities of that species encountered on the 
fishing grounds. 
 
In this context, NSAC considers that in the North Sea demersal fisheries, most chokes will be 
associated with the species not listed in Article 15 and will require more consideration by 
fisheries managers to enable the effective implementation of the LO.” 
3.5.2. Expected vs. observed choke situations 
This section has provided a fairly complete overview of the current state of knowledge regarding 
the occurrence of choke situation in the North Sea fisheries.  
 
A fundamental aspect to keep in mind is though the difference between “expected” and 
“observed” choke situations. As of today, the discussion on choke issue still remain largely 
speculative and qualitative, and all the discussion above is about understanding whether, 
where and how choke situations could possibly impact negatively the fisheries if and when the 
landing obligation was fully enforced. But in reality, the landing obligation is not fully enforced 
yet and no choke situation has been actually observed and reported by any North Sea 
Member State as part of their legal obligation to report annually on their progresses and 
challenges regarding the implementation of the landing obligation (STECF, 2018). The actual 
extent of the problem remains thus unclear. 
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4. ASSESSMENT OF THE CFP TOOLS 
This section addresses Objective C requesting to “assess whether the tools in the CFP are 
technically adequate and sufficient to implement the landing obligation and the reasons why 
some are being currently underutilized”. 
 
In this section, we review the various policy changes that have occurred since 2015 in the 
aftermath of the landing obligation. A lot of the considerations in this chapter are extracted 
from the work by (Borges et al., 2018), including some of key findings highlighted below.  
KEY FINDINGS 
 The introduction of the landing obligation in the North Sea demersal fisheries has been 
phased-in on a stock- and fishery- basis. The current discard plan includes 
provisions for several survival and de-minimis exemptions.  
 The landing obligation has also induced several policy changes beyond those 
initially foreseen in the regulation, in order to facilitate its implementation. This 
includes TAC removals, reductions in minimum landing size and changes in 
prohibited species among others.  
 No major implementation issues have yet been reported by Member States, 
indicating that these CFP tools have until now been sufficient to allow the 
fisheries to continue operating under the landing obligation.  
 However, the LO has so far had no significant impact on the way fishing is 
conducted, and the LO objective of reducing unwanted catches has not yet been 
met. By providing more flexibility, the policy changes may thus have also reduced 
the incentives to improve selectivity. 
 It is suggested to catalyse better management actions in the form of a top-down 
process whereby failure to effectively implement at least some measures 
incentivising discard reduction would preclude MS from being able to apply for 
the use of other policy tools. This process could also link measures applied to discard 
reduction targets as currently there is no obligation on MS to demonstrate such 
reductions  
 The few most difficult cases have not been phased-in yet, and it remains uncertain 
whether the CFP tools will be adequate and sufficient to deal with the landing 
obligation in 2019.  
 
4.1. CFP Tools currently implemented in the North Sea Discard plan 
 
The Scheveningen Group in collaboration with the NSAC has implemented a gradual 
implementation by stock and fishery of the landing obligation in the North Sea (Table 4), where 
the simplest cases were implemented earliest.  
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Table 4.  Gradual phasing-in of the landing obligation in the North Sea demersal 
fisheries 
Fishery Cod Haddock Saithe Whiting N. 
lobster 
Sole Plaice N. 
prawn 
Hake 
TR1 2017 2016 2016 
/2018 
2017 2017 2017 2016 2016 2019 
TR2 2018 2016 2018 2018 2016 2016 2019 2016 2019 
GN/GT 2017 2017 2018 2017 2017 2016 2019 2016 2019 
LL 2017 2017 2018 2017 2017 2017 2019 2016 2016 
BT1 2018 2017 2018 2017 2017 2017 2017 2016 2019 
BT2 2018 2017 2018 2018 2017 2016 2019 2016 2019 
TRAPS 2018 2017 2018 2017 2016 2017 2019 2016 2019 
Trawl 32-69 
mm 
2018 2017 2018 2017 2017 2017 2019 2016 2019 
Note: Cod in Kattegat in TR2 fisheries is only phased in in 2019. For saithe in TR1 fishery, only vessels which on 
average have landed more than 50% saithe over the years 2012-2014 have been phased-in in 2016. The rest is 
phased-in in 2018.  
 
Several important stocks and fisheries were phased in in 2017. However, data for that 
year were not yet available at the time of writing this study, neither from ICES nor STECF, and 
it is thus not yet possible to assess whether some discards reduction have taken place or not. 
ICES assessments for North Sea stocks including discard ratios for 2017 will be published end 
of June 2018. STECF FDI data will be compiled and published during the second half of the 
year.  
 
The current North Sea Discard Plan (EU, 2018) applicable for 2018 includes provisions for the 
nine species defining the fisheries, albeit not in all fisheries yet  
 
Table 5. Species for which the landing obligation applies in 2018.  
Fishing gear 10 Mesh size Species subject to the landing obligation 
Trawls: OTB, OTT, OT, PTB, PT, 
TBN, TBS, OTM, PTM, TMS, TM, 
TX, SDN, SSC, SPR, TB, SX, SV 
≥ 100 mm 
(TR1) 
All catches of cod, common sole, 
haddock, plaice, saithe, Northern prawn, 
and Norway lobster and whiting. 
Trawls: OTB, OTT, OT, PTB, PT, 
TBN, TBS, OTM, PTM, TMS, TM, 
TX, SDN, SSC, SPR, TB, SX, SV 
70-99 mm 
(TR2) 
All catches of cod (3), common sole, 
haddock, saithe, Northern prawn, and 
Norway lobster and whiting. 
Trawls: OTB, OTT, OT, PTB, PT, 
TBN, TBS, OTM, PTM, TMS, TM, 
TX, SDN, SSC, SPR, TB, SX, SV 
32-69 mm All catches of cod, common sole, 
haddock, plaice, saithe, Northern prawn, 
and Norway lobster and whiting. 
Beam trawls: TBB ≥ 120 mm 
(BT1) 
All catches of cod, common sole, 
haddock, plaice, saithe, Northern prawn, 
and Norway lobster and whiting. 
                                           
10  Gear codes used in this Regulation are as defined by the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations 
and can be found at http://www.fao.org/3/a-bt986e.pdf. Mesh size categories are described in section 2.2.1. 
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Beam trawls: TBB 80-119 mm 
(BT2) 
All catches of cod, common sole, 
haddock, saithe, Northern prawn, and 
Norway lobster and whiting. 
Gillnets, trammel nets and 
entangling nets:GN, GNS, GND, 
GNC, GTN, GTR, GEN, GNF 
  All catches of cod (3), common sole, 
haddock, saithe, Northern prawn, and 
Norway lobster and whiting. 
Hooks and lines:LLS, LLD, LL, 
LTL, LX, LHP, LHM 
  All catches of cod, common sole, 
haddock, hake, plaice, saithe, Northern 
prawn, and Norway lobster and whiting. 
Traps:FPO, FIX, FYK, FPN   All catches of cod, common sole, 
haddock, plaice, saithe, Northern prawn, 
and Norway lobster and whiting. 
Source:(EU, 2018)  
 
A number of exemptions are also defined, as shortly reported below 
4.1.1. High survivability exemptions  
4.1.1.1. Norway lobster 
The survivability exemption apply to the following catches of Norway lobster: 
 catches with pots (FPO (8)); 
 catches in ICES Division IIIa with bottom trawls (OTB, TBN) with a mesh size of at least 
70 mm equipped with a species selective grid with bar spacing of maximum 35 mm; 
 catches in ICES Division IIIa with bottom trawls (OTB, TBN) with a mesh size of at least 
90 mm equipped with a seltra panel; 
 in winter months (October to March), catches in the functional units Farn Deeps (FU6), 
Firth of Forth (FU8) and Moray Firth (FU9) with bottom trawls (OTB, TBN) with a mesh 
size of at least 80 mm equipped with a netgrid selectivity device. 
4.1.1.2. Common sole 
The survivability exemption applies to TR2 catches of common sole below MCRS made within 6 
nautical miles of the coast in ICES area IVc and outside identified nursery areas. The exemption 
only applies to small vessels (<10 metres length, <221 kW engine power), when fishing in 
waters with a depth of 30 metres or less and with limited tow durations of no more than 1.30 
hours. 
4.1.1.3. fish by-catch in pots and fyke nets 
The survivability exemption applies to catches of cod, haddock, whiting, plaice, sole, hake and 
saithe with pots and fyke nets (FPO, FYK). 
4.1.2. De minimis exemptions 
The following de minimis derogations apply 
 
(a) in the fisheries by vessels using trammel nets and gill nets in ICES Division IIIa, ICES 
Subarea IV and Union waters of ICES Division IIa: a quantity of common sole which shall not 
exceed 3 % of the total annual catches of that species; 
 
(b) in the fisheries by vessels using beam trawl BT2 with Flemish panel device, in ICES Subarea 
IV: a quantity of common sole below MCRS, which shall not exceed 6 % of the total annual 
catches of that species; 
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(c) in the fisheries by vessels using TR2 in ICES Subarea IV and Union waters of ICES Division 
IIa: a quantity of Norway lobster below MCRS, which shall not exceed 2 % of the total annual 
catches of that species; 
 
(d) in the fishery for Norway lobster by vessels using bottom trawls equipped with a species-
selective grid with bar spacing of maximum 35 mm in ICES Division IIIa: a combined quantity 
of common sole, haddock, whiting, cod and saithe below MCRS, which shall not exceed 4 % of 
the total annual catches of Norway lobster, common sole, haddock, whiting and Northern 
prawn, cod and saithe; 
 
(e) in the fishery for Northern prawn by vessels using bottom trawls (OTB) with a mesh size 
equal to or larger than 35 mm equipped with a species selective grid with bar spacing of 
maximum 19 mm, with unblocked fish outlet, in ICES Division IIIa: a combined quantity of 
common sole, haddock, whiting, cod, plaice and saithe below MCRS, which shall not exceed 1 
% of the total annual catches of Norway lobster, common sole, haddock, whiting, cod, saithe 
and plaice and Northern prawn; 
 
(f) in the mixed fishery for sole, whiting, plaice and species without catch limits by vessels 
using bottom trawls (OTB, OTT, SDN, SSC) of mesh size 70-99 mm in ICES Division IVc: a 
combined quantity of whiting and cod below MCRS, which shall not exceed 6 % of the total 
annual catches of Norway lobster, haddock, sole, Northern prawn, whiting, plaice, saithe and 
cod; the maximum amount of cod that may be discarded shall be limited to 2 % of those total 
annual catches; 
 
(g) in the fisheries by vessels using bottom trawls (OTB, OTT, TBN) with a mesh size of 90-119 
mm, equipped with Seltra panel, or with a mesh size of 120 mm and above in ICES Division 
IIIa: a quantity of whiting below MCRS, up to a maximum of 2 % of the total annual catches of 
Nephrops, cod, haddock, whiting, saithe, common sole, plaice and hake. 
4.1.3. Reduction of minimum sizes:  
In the Skagerrak and Kattegat in 2016, Nephrops human consumption size was also reduced 
from 130 mm and 40 mm to 105 mm total and 32 mm carapace length, respectively. A 
minimum tail length of 59 mm was added in 2017, based on STECF's assessment which states 
that such tail length corresponds to the existing values for total length and carapace length 
 
4.2. Other policy changes implemented in the North Sea since the 
beginning of the landing obligation 
 
A study on the other policy tools implemented since the beginning of the phasing in of the 
landing obligation was performed by (Borges et al., 2018) as part of the EU H2020 DiscardLess 
project. The chapter below is directly extracted from this document, with additional references 
where appropriate. 
 
Beyond the discard plan and the exemptions described above a number of other measures 
were adapted through 2015 till 2018 with the phased introduction of the landing obligation. 
These include: 
 
4.2.1. Changes in TACs 
TAC increases (also called “TAC top-ups”, “quotas uplift” or “TACs adjustments”) 
 
Since 2015, catches by fisheries subject to the phased introduction of the LO (with some 
exemptions) should have been brought to shore and landed. To accommodate the predicted 
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increase in landed catch from the fisheries subject to the phased introduction of the LO, the 
relevant 2015, 2016 and 2017 TACs were increased in accordance with the estimated 
catch that formerly would have been discarded (Borges, 2018). According to the European 
Commission (2017) TAC adjustments are part of the overall package of measures to implement 
the landing obligation but they should nevertheless not jeopardise the FMSY objective or increase 
fishing mortality.  
 
According to Borges (2018) however, of the 40, 64 and 88 TACs under the landing obligation 
between 2015-2017, respectively; around 30%, the majority of which being TACs for demersal 
stocks, were increased in 2016-2017 to account for the landing obligation, and of these 10 
TACs were set already above landings advice before any adjustments were made. Therefore, 
Borges (2018) concludes that the landing obligation is likely to have contributed to TAC 
increases above maximum advised catch in 2016 and particularly in 2017, and will 
continue to do so until 2019 when all EU TAC regulated stocks and fisheries in the Atlantic come 
under the LO.  
 
Additionally, catches of fish below MCRS reported for 2016 and 2017 by most Member States 
are extremely low and do much likely not reflect the true quantities actually being caught 
(STECF, 2018). So even when set at the level of the scientific advice, the TAC increases do 
induce an increase of fishing mortality if the adjustments are used to increase the 
landing of valuable catch rather than land the unwanted catch.  
 
TAC removal   
Removing TACs from annual TAC regulations so that associated stocks are removed from the 
landing obligation has been put forward by several stakeholders as a way to deal with 
problematic stocks, i.e. where discarding are high due to low commercial value and/or where 
quotas are insufficient to cover catches. In 2017 the EC proposed, and Council agreed to delete 
the combined TAC for dab and flounder in the North Sea, after that ICES had assessed the 
sustainability risk of that removal to these two stocks to be low11. Several additional TACs 
removals are currently under discussion.  
 
Prohibited species and zero TACs  
The criteria for listing a species as prohibited, i.e. for which discarding remains compulsory, are 
not very clear, and this can be used to remove problematic species from the landing obligation. 
In the TAC 2017 regulation (European Union, 2017), picked dogfish (spurdog, Squalus 
acanthias) was as such listed as a prohibited species. (Borges et al., 2018) notes however that 
listing a species will not necessarily lead to a decrease in mortality, as it does not incentivise 
avoidance. Without a post-release high survival, this measure adds thus little to the 
sustainability of the stock. The NSAC has expressed similar concerns (NSAC, 2017c), especially 
if the species has some non-negligible market value. The NSAC requires more transparent 
procedures and eligibility criteria under which a stock can be classified as prohibited or not.  
 
Challenges with these approaches have been analysed in depth and discussed by (STECF, 
2017d) about the management options for skates and rays, and also by (STECF, 2018), learning 
from the knowledge gained with the first avoidance programs launched in UK and Ireland (see 
further discussion in section 5.1.3). 
4.2.2. Multiannual management plans 
There has also been indirect effects of the LO in other fisheries management measures. The 
argument that the reality of mixed fisheries associated with the landing obligation and reaching 
                                           
11  http://www.ices.dk/sites/pub/Publication%20Reports/Advice/2017/Special_requests/eu.2017.04.pdf  
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Maximum Sustainable Levels (MSY) is incompatible has been gaining momentum at European 
level.  
 
FMSY upper range 
 
The management plans in the reformed CFP have no explicit harvest control rules (HCRs) but 
include FMSY ranges between which fishing opportunities can be set when pre-determined 
conditions are met (EC, 2016).  
 
The use of the FMSY upper range has been justified to allow for mixed fisheries to adapt to the 
landing obligation. Managers argued that extra flexibility is needed to cope with the landing 
obligation and avoid premature fisheries closures, while NGOs defend that the objective of 
“above MSY levels” enshrined in the CFP is not in line with any F value above FMSY (Borges et 
al., 2018). The harvest control provisions detailed in the multiannual plans already agreed and 
proposed, i.e. when FMSY ranges and additional management measures are applicable, are not 
clear and leave many unanswered questions.  
 
ICES has started investigating how a mixed-fisheries advice using the Fmsy ranges could 
work in practice, following the work by (Ulrich et al., 2017). In 2017, an experimental “range 
scenario” was presented (ICES, 2017c) that minimizes the potential for TAC mismatches in 
2018 within the FMSY range. This scenario returns a fishing mortality by stock (  
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Figure 14) which, if used for setting single-stock fishing opportunities for 2018, may reduce 
the gap between the most and the least restrictive TACs, thus reducing the potential for 
quota over- and undershoot ( 
 
Figure 15). This “range” scenario suggests that the potential for mixed-fisheries mismatch 
would be lowered with a 2018 TAC in the lower part of the FMSY range for Eastern English 
Channel plaice and saithe, and in the upper part of the range for cod and North Sea plaice. 
 
As mentioned above, discussions are now ongoing between the European Commission, ICES 
and STECF on how to move forward and what additional FMSY ranges scenarios might be 
explored in the 2018 Mixed-fisheries advice.  
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Figure 14. North Sea mixed-fisheries 2018 “range” fishing mortality within the FMSY 
range, compared with FMSY, current F (F in 2016), and F in the single-stock 
advice for 2018. The “range” F is the one giving the lowest difference in 
tonnage between the “Max” and and the “Min” scenario across all stocks 
and fleets. 
 
Source:(ICES, 2017c)  
 
 
Figure 15. Comparison of the outcomes in terms of total catches in 2018 (left) and 
SSB in 2019 (right) between the FMSY-based single-stock advice and the 
Frange-based forecast. 
 
Source:(ICES, 2017c)  
 
 
Target and bycatch species 
The new multiannual management plan for the North Sea (EC, 2016) distinguished between 
several types of species: a) species that should be managed according to MSY (FMSY by 2020), 
b) species that may be managed according to the precautionary approach if MSY scientific 
advice is not available, and c) other species not subject to catch limits to be managed based 
on the precautionary approach.  
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De facto, these new provisions establish a difference between target and bycatch species, and 
to what level they should be managed under the CFP. The argument that flexibility is 
needed from industry and managers is contra-balanced by NGOs that the CFP MSY objective is 
applicable to all species, regardless is they are commercial or not. 
4.3. Conclusions on Objective C 
The objective C requested to assess whether the tools in the CFP are technically adequate and 
sufficient to implement the landing obligation and the reasons why some are being currently 
underutilized. Answering this question is delicate, and involves also some degree of personal 
judgement and personal reflections.  
 
First of all, the landing obligation has certainly triggered major progresses in the awareness of 
the problems with discards, of the factors causing them, of the data and knowledge available 
and in the remaining gaps and challenges.  
 
The landing obligation is now reaching an interesting paradox (Figure 16). In the one 
hand, the review above have demonstrated that numerous policy changes have been 
implemented in the last three years in the aftermath of the landing obligation. These 
additional policy changes were not originally foreseen in the 2013 CFP (Borges et al., 2018). 
No major implementation issues have yet been reported by Member States (STECF, 2018), 
indicating that these CFP tools have until now been sufficient to allow the fisheries to 
continue operating under the landing obligation.  
 
On the other hand, it is obvious that by providing increased flexibility to deal with the landing 
obligation, these changes have circumvented the primary objective of the landing 
obligation of reducing unwanted catch and changing fishing practices. So the landing 
obligation has so far had no significant impact to date on the way fishing is conducted. 
Discarding continues and there is no indication yet that discard rates are reducing.  
 
In that sense, one can consider that the tools in the CFP are so far been technically 
adequate and sufficient to implement the landing obligation for the fisheries already 
included; but they have not been technically adequate and sufficient to reduce 
discards. 
 
Figure 16. The landing obligation dilemma 
 
 
 
This paradox calls for reflections on how to proceed further, in order to avoid watering down 
the objectives of the landing obligation without jeopardizing the economic viability of 
the fisheries. Such discussions have taken place in the frame of the H2020 Project DiscardLess 
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(Fitzpatrick and Nielsen, 2018; Fitzpatrick et al., 2018)12. A major policy challenge now is to 
catalyse action at the management level. These authors suggest that such a change could 
take the form of a top-down process whereby failure to effectively implement at least 
some measures incentivizing discard reduction would preclude MS from being able to 
apply for the use of other policy tools such as the removal of choke problem stocks from 
the TAC system. This process could also link measures applied to establishing discard 
reduction targets as currently there is no obligation on MS to demonstrate such reductions 
but merely to document what measures have been applied (STECF, 2018). In the same way, 
some NGOs have proposed specific cases where industry should only receive supports if they 
have implemented effective selectivity measures. A more general application of this approach 
could incentivize progress while reducing industry fears regarding bankruptcies,  
 
To incentivize actual discards reductions in the fisheries already under the landing obligation, 
it could thus also be considered whether the continued use of the current CFP tools already 
implemented could be made conditional on demonstrated evidence of changes in 
behavior towards more selective practices and increased volumes of unwanted 
catches brought to land and recorded; failure to demonstrate this could trigger the 
abandoning of the CFP tool and the returning to the previous situation.  
 
A second reflection is whether the current CFP tools can be considered to be technically 
adequate and sufficient for the most difficult cases described in Chapter 3 to be phased-in in 
2019. This issue is the topic of the next chapter (Objective D).  
 
  
                                           
12  Unpublished at the time of writing. 
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5. FUTURE SCENARIOS IN 2019 AND AFTER 
 
The Objective D requested “considering future scenarios after 2019 following full 
implementation of the landing obligation and the future of the EU with 27 Members States or 
any other likely scenario (i.e. Climate change), make predictions about the impact of the 
problems both biological, economic and social and the efficiency / sufficiency of EU actions and 
instruments to mitigate effects of the landing obligation. Identify alternative solutions: (e.g. 
redistribution of quotas underused; adjustments to the TAC and quota system; or any other 
viable solutions)” 
KEY FINDINGS 
 Alternative policy options could be considered to address the most difficult potential 
choke situations, provided that they also incentivise some changes in fishing practices.  
 Stable political solutions should be sought to address the recurring issue of 
climate-related changes in fish distribution on a more permanent and long-term 
oriented basis.  
 no simple single management option seem to offer an adequate balance 
between exploitation and conservation in the case of sensitive valuable bycatch like 
sharks and rays 
 Fully Documented Fisheries with Remote Electronic Monitoring together with a 
smarter use of TAC top-ups can be the fundament of a results-based management 
system focusing on impact and controllability, where fishers are fully accountable 
of their catch. 
 
At the time of writing this report, perspectives for 2019 for the North Sea demersal fisheries 
and beyond remain unclear. Concerning the future of EU with 27 Members States (“Brexit”), 
the decision taken in March 2018 to implement a 21 months transition period where EU law 
would still apply to UK fisheries has delayed the most difficult decisions, so the need for new 
institutional arrangements will not coincide with the end of the implementation period for the 
landing obligation. Whatsoever, it is obvious that the landing obligation can be a non-negligible 
aspect of the future relationships between UK and EU in terms of fisheries management. On 
the one hand, the landing obligation has been pushed in the CFP following strong public 
pressure primarily in UK, and it remains therefore unknown to which extent the commitment 
to ban discarding might be reduced in an EU without UK. On the other hand, a fully enforced 
and controlled landing obligation in UK waters would certainly significantly impact fisheries 
management in EU, as has long been the case in the Norwegian waters with regards to e.g. 
mesh size control. Either way, at this stage the situation is still too unclear and complex to be 
addressed in this present report, and we refer to other studies discussing the Brexit challenges 
more in depth cf. e.g. (European Parliament, 2017). 
 
Without making predictions as such, in this part I further discuss some of the most important 
unresolved challenges described in Chapters 3 and 4. A disclaimer regarding this chapter is that 
it was written up in April 2018, a few weeks before the submission and evaluation of regional 
Joint Recommendations for 2019. It is evident that the issues discussed below are likely very 
similar to the issues currently faced by Member States regarding the 2019 implementation 
where all regulated species will be phased-in. The author of this present report has not been 
involved in the drafting of the North Sea discard plan by the Scheveningen Group, and the 
considerations given below are thus only personal reflections.  
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5.1. Specific choke situations 
This paragraph discusses a number of specific cases of risks of choke, which cannot be easily 
approached with the current CFP Tools and would require alternative thinking.  
5.1.1. North Sea plaice 
Although this is not mentioned in the NSAC general overview (NSAC, 2017a), It has been clearly 
described in Chapter 3 that one of the most difficult challenges for the North Sea fisheries 
remains the issue of North Sea plaice in the mixed flatfish beam trawl fishery operated primarily 
by the Netherlands and Belgium. It is expected that the landing obligation of plaice will be a 
choke species that in the worst case would stop the BT2 sole fisheries, mainly related to the 
high costs of landing all catches. The North Sea plaice represents a different situation that 
illustrates that discarding and sustainability are different issues not necessarily 
linked: Discards represented around 35% of the catches of North Sea plaice in 2016, mainly 
constituted of small animals below MCRS. The stock has been exploited at Fmsy since 2009 
and the biomass has been increasing to levels never observed before. The MSY-based TAC is 
not limiting the fisheries, with an uptake around 60% in 2016, and total catch representing 
64% of the total advised catches13.  
 
To address this, the Netherlands have engaged in a number of scientific and technical projects 
in the recent years, but results have so far remained largely unconclusive (NSAC, 2017d). In 
particular:  
 Because of the differences in body shape between plaice and sole, technical options for 
improved selectivity and enhanced escapement of plaice in the trawl are limited 
 There are not many areas and seasons in the sole distribution area where plaice is not 
found (Rijnsdorp et al., 2006).  
 Survival studies so far have not given the expected evidence that plaice survival could 
be considered sufficiently high (around 16%), and the level is strongly dependent on 
fishing practices in the water and handling techniques on the deck of vessels. 
 The current perspectives for developing new markets for unwanted plaice do not seem 
financially viable so far. 
 
In reality, these reasoning may also apply to some extent to a lot of other stocks, but the 
quantities involved and the high abundance of the plaice stock make this case slightly different. 
As such, this stock has been classified as a choke situation 4 (“Economic choke”) (NSAC, 
2017a), as the only one stock in this category. The main threat is thus not of biological nature, 
but of political and economic. 
 
Additional research projects are still ongoing, including among others survival studies, 
selectivity trials and fine-scale discards mapping. Given this current state of knowledge, a 
possible scenario remain though that no viable technical solution is found in 2019, and none of 
the current CFP tools discussed in Chapter 4 is able to help significantly either. This will create 
a very difficult situation for the industry and the policy makers, and additional “out-of-the-box” 
decisions may have to be made, although the “out of the box” considerations listed by (NSAC, 
2017a) seem neither fully adequate in this case.  
 
As long as the stock remains in its very good current status with low fishing mortality, high 
biomass, non-negligible discard survival rates and catches way below the advised levels, 
biological risks are low and that there are little adverse incentives that could lead to unforeseen 
and unmonitored mortality. Under specific favorable circumstances such as these other policy 
arrangements could be imagined, for example some level of flexibility might be considered 
                                           
13  http://ices.dk/sites/pub/Publication%20Reports/Advice/2017/2017/ple.27.420.pdf  
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against e.g. provision for fully documented fisheries and sustained efforts to increase 
selectivity.  
5.1.2. Northern Hake and other distributional issues linked to climate change 
In the North Sea, hake will be phased-in in 2019. Hake is an emblematic case of choke level 
(Baudron and Fernandes, 2015), both at level 2 (with the historical allocation key of the relative 
stability no more in line with the current geographical distribution of the stock following its 
recent recovery and its expansion in the North Sea), but also to some extent at level 3, with 
total landings and catches well above the corresponding advised levels14. According to the CMT 
analyses performed in the North Western Waters, the issue of the hake quota problem appears 
less severe in the ICES Area VI and VII and hake is considered to be only at moderate choke 
risk (STECF, 2018).  
 
The knowledge on possible avoidance and selectivity options for hake in the North Sea seems 
limited. Recent initiatives on the dissemination of gear trial results to fishermen such as the 
the gear trial factsheets of the H2020 Project DISCARDLESS 
(www.discardless.eu/selectivity_manual) and the Gearing Up initiative (https://gearingup.eu) 
include only limited information about hake. The author of this report is not aware of current 
selectivity programs dealing with this stock. As discussed earlier, the hake issue affects the UK 
more particularly, so political solutions to this issue will be intrinsically linked to the future 
impact of Brexit on the Common Fishery Policy.  
 
Beyond the short-term options of continued voluntary swaps between Member States, this 
stock symbolizes the political difficulties that will be increasingly faced by Member States in the 
light of climate change. Changes in fish stocks distribution are occurring fast and wide, and 
ICES has identified distributional changes for 16 out of 21 species analysed15. The traditional 
target species disappear from their historical fishing grounds and become more abundant up 
north; and new species appear, for which Member States have no historical fishing quotas. The 
issue of hake has been described here, but similar stories have also happened for e.g. mackerel, 
cod, boarfish and, more recently, bluefin tuna which has returned into the North European 
waters. There is no doubt that these problems will not disappear and will rather accelerate, 
creating unbearable situation for the fishing industry in the frame of the landing obligation. 
Noticeably, the Brexit makes this situation even more complicated, because the TAC-regulated 
species become more abundant mainly in the waters around the British Isles. As long as the 
relative stability is not renegotiated, stable political solutions should be sought to address 
this recurring issue on a more permanent and long-term oriented basis (cf. section 
5.2).  
 
5.1.3. Elasmobranchs 
Skates, rays and sharks are considered all together, while in reality they represent a variety of 
issues. Elasmobranchs include a number of species with marked differences in stock status and 
sensitiveness, and they usually fetch a fair market price making them attractive to be landed 
and sold once caught.  
 
Skates and rays are currently managed under five regional TACs. Each is a general skate and 
ray TAC including several species. In 2019, these species will thus come under the landing 
obligation, which will have large implications. 
 
STECF (STECF, 2017d) convened an Expert Working Group dedicated to the future 
management of skates and rays, which collated a vast amount of the knowledge available on 
                                           
14  http://ices.dk/sites/pub/Publication%20Reports/Advice/2017/2017/hke.27.3a46-8abd.pdf  
15  http://www.ices.dk/sites/pub/Publication%20Reports/Advice/2017/Special_requests/eu.2017.05.pdf  
Landing Obligation and Choke Species in Multispecies and Mixed Fisheries – The North Sea 
 
 
 
several important aspects including i) improved description of catch distribution across species, 
areas, seasons and métiers; ii) selectivity and avoidance measures; iii) survival after being 
caught and release. While a lot of useful information could be synthetized, this work also 
highlighted numerous knowledge gaps; in particular, it is evident that the knowledge available 
is often not enough distinguished between the various species.  
 
In terms of discard survival, STECF highlighted the limited number and large variability of 
estimates of discard survival rates. It also shows that those estimates are not always 
comparable because of the diversity of approaches and methodologies followed. While many 
studies report rather high to very high survival rates (usually sensibly above 35-40%), it 
remains difficult to extrapolate these estimates across all species and métiers to support 
requests for exemption from the landing obligation. 
In terms of selectivity, STECF noted that measures such as increased codend mesh sizes and 
square mesh panels are ineffective for skates and rays because their large, flattened body 
shape prevents escape once inside fishing gears. Conversely, STECF observes that 
improvements in the selectivity of trawls for skates may be achieved through modifications 
which utilise the difference in shape and size of skates and behaviour compared with other 
species in the catch. This includes e.g. grids and By-catch Reduction Devices (BRDs), escape 
panels and separator trawls. The knowledge here is insufficient and fragmented but preliminary 
results demonstrate good potential for these modifications to reduce catches of skates and 
rays. 
 
STECF also analysed a long suite of possible management scenarios for skates and rays 
including: 
 Splitting or lumping TACs across several species 
 Landing trips limits 
 Spatio-temporal closures 
 Listing as prohibited species 
A conclusion of this review was however that no “silver bullet” solution could deliver the 
right balance between conservation and exploitation in the frame of the landing 
obligation, and all options had pros and cons. These results are consistent with the first 
empirical experiences gained with the pilot avoidance programs for picked dogfish (Squalus 
acanthia, also called spurdog) in the Irish Sea launched by UK and Ireland (STECF, 2018), 
which demonstrated the challenges in encouraging avoidance while allowing a limited bycatch 
limit without choking the fishery at the same time.  
5.1.4. Other potential risks of choke 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the analysis of potential choke situation has so far mainly focused 
on main commercial stocks, and little documentation is yet available on the potential risks of 
secondary species like turbot, brill or lemon sole, which will be phased in in 2019. Cod in 
Kattegat is also expected to pose serious issues in 2019.  
The NSAC (NSAC, 2017a) has listed and discussed in generic terms a “ToolBox” of alternative 
policy changes that could be potentially used, but without investigating in more details which 
tool could be preferred in which situation. As was described in the previous chapter on 
elasmobranchs, all tools have advantages and drawbacks, and none of them can be considered 
as a unique and simple way forward.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, we suggest that any such policy change should be conditional on 
the demonstrated implementation of some measures incentivizing discard reduction, to trigger 
changes in selectivity. This is further detailed in the next paragraph. 
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5.2. Alternative approaches to incentivize discards reduction 
In this chapter, we explore a number of pragmatic ideas, which could potentially trigger positive 
changes in fishing practices and deliver effective discards reductions. These ideas are not out 
of scope of the current CFP setup, and could realistically and technically be implemented in 
European fisheries (in particular in the North Sea).  
5.2.1. More efficient quota swaps 
Improved quotas swaps are repeatedly pointed out as a way to reduce choke situations 
through better and fairer access to quota, both across and within Member States. However, 
history has largely proven that the current system of voluntary bilateral swaps is quite 
inefficient, non-transparent and cumbersome, and that there is often little incentives for 
countries who own a lot of quotas to give away to those who don’t (Hoefnagel et al., 2015). 
This is further reinforced when discarding is banned, and will be even more difficult when UK 
becomes a third country. The same is observed for the distribution of quotas within Member 
States (Carpenter and Kleinjans, 2017). 
 
The landing obligation has also evidenced that the current system is flawed, when most 
potential choke situations identified in the North Sea are of category 2 (or 1). i.e. there 
is enough TAC in the system but it is not taken up because of distributional inequities, which 
indicates that the swaps are naturally not efficient enough to solve the problem. The issues 
are political more than biological. Political will is thus needed to force these swaps in 
a more efficient manner. One option would be to enforce stronger mechanisms in the spirit 
of “use it or lose it”, but without undue increases of fishing effort and fishing mortality. Another 
option would be to a transparent market place for leasing unused quotas at EU level, following 
what can be seen at national level such as e.g. the Danish quota pools.  
5.2.2. Smarter use of TAC adjustments (‘top-ups’) 
For the stocks included in the landing obligation, the TAC is now given as a Catch TAC, intented 
to cover landings of both the wanted and the unwanted (previously discarded) catch. No specific 
provision has been made to use this additional TAC in a given way. It is thus distributed to 
Member States following the standard Relative Stability key and, within a Member State, 
following the standard procedures for national quota distribution. As such, this approach 
fails completely in addressing the main cause of choke situation, for the choke 
categories 1 and 2, because it distributes the additional quota to those who 
proportionally have the largest share of it in the first place.  
 
It is urgent to recognize that these TAC adjustments should not be treated as a standard 
landing TAC, but could be used in a much smarter way to incentivize discard reduction. 
There are different ways by which this could be done, and we here only suggest a few ideas, 
which could be further developed if there is interest for.  
 
Top-ups could be allocated proportionally to discards estimates rather than landings key. This 
option is mentioned but is probably not politically acceptable, as it would be perceived as a 
reward for those with worse discard patterns, and would also be perceived as a distortion of 
the relative stability. 
 
More interestingly, top-ups could be kept as a buffer to cover the discarding which is by 
default expected to continue, and could be used for landings only against demonstrated 
evidence that the discards are less than assumed. The top-ups would not be distributed blindly 
to Member States and/or POs or individual vessels but would for example remain in a pool 
centrally administrated, considered to cover the assumed discards. Ultimately, if a MS, a fleet 
or a fisher would want to use their share for landings, they would need to provide reliable catch 
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records including landings of unwanted catches (below minimum size) and demonstrate that 
their ratio of unwanted catches is equal or less than the average estimate for that fleet. This 
practice would thus reward selectivity improvement, catch recording and the bringing to land 
of unwanted catches.  
 
Ultimately, inspiration could be taken from New Zealand, where overquota landings is allowed 
but the landing value is not returned to the fisher (the so-called “deemed value”), removing 
thus some of the most obvious negative incentives (Marchal et al., 2016; Hersoug, 2018). 
 
This smart use of TAC top-up would be a way to transition to an actual results-based 
management with full accountability, which is further described in the next paragraph.  
5.2.3. Control, monitoring and results-based management 
This issue is not specific to the North Sea, but is a generic well-known unresolved issue 
for the landing obligation, which is systematically brought in discussions. The need for 
adequate control and monitoring is discussed in several reports and publications, and is well 
summarized in the publication by (Catchpole et al., 2017) as follows: “One of the key challenges 
of the LO is the need for new regulatory and enforcement mechanisms, as the focus of 
monitoring and control shifts from landing activities to activities at sea. This shift requires that 
fishing and discarding practices around the vessel are 100 per cent monitored during 
fishing in order to detect what is caught and whether there is discarding. Currently, 
traditional methods of monitoring, which include dockside and fish market checking; the 
use of aircraft (including drones) to fly over fishing vessels; patrol vessels to carry out 
inspections at sea; vessel monitoring systems (VMS) using satellite positional data to plot the 
speed and location of vessels; observers on board vessels to record catches and other scientific 
data; and self- reported data (E-log, paper logbooks, sale notes, landing declarations), can 
meet this need only to a limited extent”. 
 
In recognition of this, increasing attention is being applied to Fully Documented Fisheries (FDF) 
with remote electronic monitoring (REM, or EM) systems as a means of attaining 100 per cent 
monitoring of fishing activities (this does not mean that 100% of the videos must actually be 
reviewed, but that any haul can potentially be controlled at any time after it took place). 
Several successful REM studies have been conducted over the last decade in North Sea 
countries (Denmark, Scotland, England, Netherlands and Germany), allowing a detailed 
understanding of the technical and operational aspects of REM systems, and triggering their 
technological developments in order to reduce their costs and optimize their use and their 
acceptance (Mortensen , van Helmond et al., subm.). Results have been largely positive and 
REM are seen as the most cost-effective way to improve catch monitoring in the 
landing obligation (Plet-Hansen et al., 2017). Going some steps further, FDF is seen as a 
fundamental pillar of the design of a results-based management system where fishers are 
fully accountable of their catch and are incentivized to reduce their unwanted catches 
through a sensible balance between self-management and control (Ulrich et al., 2015; 
Mortensen et al., 2017). This system is further described in the document by (Schou, 2018) 
who suggests to relax REM vessels from most technical rules against the full documentation 
and monitoring of their catches, including: 
 
 Full quota top-up for REM vessels and reduced or no top-up for non-REM vessels 
 Free choice of gear for REM vessels - except for rules related to bottom impact and 
bycatches of protected species. 
 Simplified exemptions for REM vessels. The main point is that catches are recorded and 
accounted for. 
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This combined approach is thought to be potentially the most adequate and cost-effective way 
to implement the objectives of the article 15, moving the focus away from stringent 
technical rules into a more flexible management system focusing on impact and 
controllability, which is the approach successfully tested in the Cod Catch Quota Management 
(CQM) trials (Mortensen , van Helmond et al., subm.). Quoting (Catchpole et al., 2017), “of 
course, it could be argued that in such voluntary trials it is hard to disentangle incentives arising 
from additional quota from those arising from the REM, and it might be the case that the 
skippers of voluntary vessels are those already most likely to comply and keenest to collaborate 
with scientists. It is thus difficult to infer how REM would work if it became compulsory for all 
vessels. However, experiences in Canada and USA demonstrated that larger discard 
reductions were achieved after REM became mandatory compared with the initial 
years when the system was voluntary. This is because the system became more strictly 
enforced and included all vessel operators, including the less cooperative ones (McElderry, 
2014).” 
5.2.4. Prioritizing the objective of reducing discards over the objective of 
bringing to land 
In the same line of thinking, a reflection could be conducted on the actual obligation to bring 
to land. The obligation to bring to land has an underlying idea that it is easier to monitor and 
control what is landed than what is discarded at sea. However, numerous scientific 
investigations have shown that the actual requirement of bringing to land is among the 
most disputed elements of the landing obligation, because of the repeated arguments 
among others that 1) capacity onboard vessels is limited, 2) bringing to land incurs extra costs 
by requiring more numerous returns to port and increase burden on crew, 3) most harbors and 
the value chain cannot logistically and financially deal with the unwanted catch brought to shore 
and 4) dead discards are probably better left in the ocean for the ecosystem food chain than 
brought to landfill (Sardà et al., 2013; Veiga et al., 2016; Catchpole et al., 2017; Fitzpatrick et 
al., 2017).  
 
Additionally, as discussed in the section 5.2.3 above, monitoring at sea is becoming increasingly 
accessible and cost-effective via the use of electronic monitoring, and is widely used for bycatch 
monitoring in several world regions including South America and Pacific Islands, not necessarily 
in combination with an obligation to bring to land. 
 
Building on the elements described in sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3 above, it might therefore be 
reconsidered whether the two aspects could be disentangled, what sort of control is indeed 
most appropriate and achievable (Hedley et al., 2015), and whether effective discard 
reductions and selectivity improvements might first be achieved in some fisheries 
without the requirement to bring unwanted catches to land. This requirement might still 
be implemented at a later stage, once the most difficult transition has been achieved.  
5.3. Conclusions on Objective D 
This chapter has developed some of the issues presented in Objectives B and C. A number of 
issues appears fundamentally unresolved. The CFP Article 15 has been designed to address 
the most well-known causes of discarding that had been heavily discussed during the reform 
of the CFP prior to 2013, and personified by the case of North Sea Cod overquota discards. 
However, some the cases discussed here cannot be easily addressed by the existing CFP 
tools and accompanying policy adjustments discussed in Objective C. These issues require thus 
considering alternative options that could allow pursuing the CFP objectives of sustainability 
and discards reduction without jeopardizing the future of the fishing industry. Such options 
would require efficient management actions that do not simply allow today’s practices to 
continue, but incentivize changes in a results-oriented approach focusing on impact 
and controllability.  
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In conclusion, the landing obligation as it is now appears like a system that has “neither a stick 
nor a carrot”. An effective implementation of a ban on discarding requires high levels of at-sea 
monitoring and effective control, and/or strong incentives to fish more selectively, neither of 
which currently apply.  
 
To improve this situation, it is necessary to consider both the need for flexibility and policy 
adjustments in order allow fisheries to continue operating under the landing obligation, and the 
need to incentivize selectivity improvements. We suggest that any future policy change should 
be granted conditionally to the demonstrated implementation of measures effectively triggering 
discard reduction.  
 
Fully Documented Fisheries with Remote Electronic Monitoring can be the fundament of a 
results-based management system focusing on impact and controllability, where fishers are 
fully accountable of their catch. 
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